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Cold War development, operations in the Balkans, and differences across the Atlantic 
also provided grounds for a revision of NATO’s purely self-defense dimension.  
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Summit in Prague 2002, NATO initiated a new concept transforming itself into an 
effective organization with a global approach. By establishing the NATO Response 
Force, balancing the burden-shifting, and opening the security dialog among likeminded 
allies, NATO renewed the essence of common transatlantic values.  
By analyzing NATO’s role and its prevailing tendencies, this thesis contends that 
NATO is no longer a regional security organization but a collective security instrument 
with its first front abroad, in the Greater Middle East and Northern Africa. However, if 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE  
The primary purposes of this thesis are to discuss the role of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in the era of globalization, elucidate tendencies in the 
international security system, examine rifts prevailing in the transatlantic link, and survey 
NATO’s recent progress and development.  
This thesis also analyzes what determines and forces NATO to extend its 
activities out-of-area. By exploring the emerging threats in the context of recent 
geopolitical changes, the intention is to stress the fact that an out-of-area agenda is 
now irrelevant as NATO’s recent transformation has assumed a global character. 
Acquiring the broader security role, NATO must be actively engaged in the security 
agenda of the international system organized by the United Nations.   
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The future of NATO has been discussed continuously since the end of the Cold 
War. Is NATO still relevant and needed in today’s globalized world when the Soviet 
threat has vanished? Will NATO be redundant in view of the European Union’s security 
arrangement? Should NATO focus only on the Euro-Atlantic area or expand beyond its 
traditional boundaries?  
The euphoria over the end of the bi-polar world resulted in an across-the-board 
downsizing of armed forces and reduced military budgets. It seemed that the new 
international system had nothing to fear any longer.  
However, the emergence of new threats, namely terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, forced NATO to redefine its posture and structure. 
Moreover, new security challenges emphasized the need to transform all elements of the 
security environment concerning collective defense, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.  
2 
NATO opted to extend its activities beyond the traditional borders. As a matter of 
fact, NATO’s new global role raises several questions that are examined in this thesis as 
follows:   
• What is the nature and scope of the NATO’s security role?    
• How did the changes in the security environment influence NATO?  
• How did the differences in American and European strategies affect 
NATO’s development? 
• What is the principle and development of the out-of-area issue? 
• What is the impact of recent and current operations to NATO’s 
transformation? 
• What is the significance of the NATO Response Force?  
• What is the scope of the NATO’s future security role? 
 
NATO is a central security pillar of transatlantic security, the guarantor of 
European stability, a mechanism for American engagement in Europe. The possibilities 
in the United States and Europe for building international institutions, practices, 
processes, and relationships are not to be found in many other places around the world 
because common interests and values are dissimilar and cannot be duplicated. NATO has 
recently undergone profound changes and transformed itself into an effective “peace-
enforcement”1 organization. It has created the innovative military capability—NATO 
Response Force and transformed its structure to meet new challenges.  
Now, the significance of the Alliance is expanding as a major multi-national 
security organization. Additionally, the NATO allies are essential donors for 
international aid and developmental assistance.  
For the last 50 years, the NATO’s center of gravity has been in Western Europe, 
but the center of activity is moving east and south. The geostrategic center of interest for 
the foreseeable future will be the Greater Middle East. There is an emerging concern to 
NATO’s south because Africa is replete with ungoverned spaces that can attract 
terrorists, radical fundamentalism, WMD, and all kinds of criminality. 
                                                 
1 Giovanna Bono, NATO’s ‘Peace-Enforcement’ Tasks and ‘Policy Communities’: 1990-1999, 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p. 135. 
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NATO has become an even more powerful player on the world scene. The threats 
sustained its unity and provided developed its strategy. Regarding its future role, NATO 
is more or less identical to the role of the United Nations—“to maintain international 
peace and security.”2 This clearly indicates that NATO and the UN strategies should 
emerge into one concerted endeavor guaranteeing the sustainable development of the 
international system.  
Successful strategies in the global era require much closer coordination between 
the economic, military, legal, environmental, and scientific and technological 
policymaking communities. There are few areas in which cooperation must be promoted 
as greatly as homeland security. A balanced burden-sharing relationship is an immediate 
imperative. However, these subjects are beyond the horizon of this thesis. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY  
In order to elucidate its role in the future, this thesis discusses NATO’s 
development and issues that affected NATO, such as the changing character of both 
environment and warfare. This thesis employs a policy options analysis and is based upon 
a qualitative survey of relevant literature, including primary and secondary sources.  
The primary sources are The North Atlantic Treaty, Charter of the United 
Nations, NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1991, the Washington Summit Communiqué, the 
Prague Summit Declaration, NATO Handbook and others like The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, European Security Strategy, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report of 2002 and others related to the topic. The secondary sources 
include political-military analysis from the Internet and journals. In order to achieve a 
positivist approach, descriptive and deductive methods are used. The thesis is organized 
as follows.  
Chapter I introduces the purpose and importance of this thesis. Chapter II 
provides the basic characteristics of the international system and examines the main 
changes in geopolitics. This also examines the phenomenon of globalization and the 
                                                 
2 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1, available at: 
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>, accessed 11 January 2004. 
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terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The chapter reassesses the security environment 
and describes two major threats: terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Chapter III presents the transatlantic security environment. It illustrates the 
American and European efforts reflected by the pertinent strategic concepts, which 
provide indispensable instruments for a stable transatlantic security. This chapter also 
discusses the different strategies on both sides of the Atlantic that split the Alliance and a 
current attempt to heal the rift.  
Chapter IV analyzes NATO’s current role and its security interest. Because of 
analogical evidence provided in previous chapters, this chapter discusses NATO’s 
objectives of adapting to the new strategic environment and also examines the foundation 
and development of NATO’s out-of-area issue and the current NATO operations. The 
chapter discusses the reasons for the NATO’s reform to accept tasks beyond its area of 
responsibility in order to meet the new challenges. 
Chapter V reveals that NATO is a significant component of the international 
peace augmented by the Prague Capabilities Commitment. The chapter discussed the 
NATO Response Force as an innovative military capability to meet threats from global 
terrorism. Since the character of threats has challenged the United States to act globally, 
it also forces NATO to assume global responsibilities. Otherwise, without a clear 
purpose, it may lose its legitimacy and the will to live.  
Chapter VI concludes that NATO’s agenda shapes security for the better. This 
fact is hardly invisible in the United Nations’ peace agenda. However, the new challenges 
exist owing to complex environmental, political, military, economic, legal, and social 
interconnections. The new challenges also mandate a UN transformation that will 
urgently require peace-enforcing teeth to be relevant in a global age. NATO after 
acquiring the proper agility will be an appropriate instrument for the UN to organize the 
future international system.        
5 
II. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
A. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM  
By exploring the principle of the international system, this chapter describes the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) role in the international system. NATO, an 
international organization of collective defense and security in the Euro-Atlantic region, 
has played an indispensable role in the international system for decades. According to 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, while first visiting the United States, 
“NATO remains the world’s most effective security coalition. And NATO still delivers 
security when it is needed, and where it is needed, even in a radically new security 
environment.”3 Since NATO is an effective international organization, Jessica Mathews 
pointed out in this regard, “international organizations were institutions of, by, and for 
nation-states.”4  
As the state-nations create the basic construction of the world system, the 
permanent drama is an interaction among them. For example, Hans Morgenthau pro-
claims a never-ending struggle for power among states, arising from natural human 
tendencies to dominate others.5  On the other hand, Glen Snyder, while comparing 
Mearsheimer and Waltz theories asserts:  
what drives it is not an appetite for power in the human animal, but a 
search for security that is forced by the anarchic structure of the 
international system. When all states have capabilities for doing each other 
harm, each is driven to amass as much power as it can to be as secure as 
possible against attack.6  
 Considering security consequences, Waltz implies that “In anarchy, security is 
the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as 
                                                 
3 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General speech at the National Defense University, 
Washington, 29 January 2004, NATO Integrated Data Service, available at: 
<http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0401&L=natodata>. 
4 Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, (Jan-Feb 1997) vol. 76 no. 1,  p. 59. 
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., Chapter 1, p. 4. 
6 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” 
International Security, Vol. 27, No.1 (Summer 2002), p 151. 
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tranquillity, profit and power. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to 
maintain their positions in the system.”7 
It is premature to consider the nation-states as major actors that are excluded from 
the global scene. However, while discussing the security of the states, their behavior, and 
their interaction, the distinction must be made both between variables at the level of the 
states and variables at the level of the system.8 “States are not and never have been the 
only international actors,”9 says Waltz. Robert Hunter concludes, “In terms of mobilizing 
military power, nation-states do not have a complete monopoly.”10  
International order is possible without world government because states recognize 
that they have certain interests and some values in common, regard themselves bound by 
a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of 
common institutions—diplomacy, war, international law, and balance of power.11 
According to Jessica Mathews, 
 The state’s central task of assuring security is the least affected, but still 
not exempt. War will not disappear, but with the shrinkage of U.S. and 
Russian nuclear arsenals, the transformation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty into a permanent covenant in 1995, agreement on 
the long-sought Comprehensive Test Ban treaty in 1996, and the likely 
entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the 
security threat to states from other states is on a downward course. 
Nontraditional threats, however, are rising—terrorism, organized crime, 
drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, and the combination of rapid population 
growth, environmental decline, and poverty that breeds economic 
stagnation, political instability, and, sometimes, state collapse.12  
                                                 
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 126, 
in Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” 
International Security, Vol. 27, No.1 (Summer 2002), p 152. 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, Chapter 
5, p. 79.  
9 Ibid., p. 93. 
10 Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, 
NDU Press, 2001, Chapter 4, Robert E. Hunter, “Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics,” 
p.  115. 
11 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World  Politics, second edition, London: 
MacMillan Press Ltd., 1995, p. 13, in James P. Muldoon, Jr., The Architecture of Global Governance, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2004, p. 6. 
12 Jessica T. Mathews, p. 50. 
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These trends have created a growing sense of security shifting from the traditional 
nation-state’s security pattern represented by foreign relations and military strength. 
Consequently, security is now viewed as emerging from daily human aspects related to 
food, shelter, employment, health, and public safety. In this context, Jessica Mathew 
asserts that,  
The new technologies encourage noninstitutional, shifting networks over 
the fixed bureaucratic hierarchies … They dissolve issues’ and 
institutions’ ties to a fixed place. And by greatly empowering individuals, 
they weaken the relative attachment to community, of which the 
preeminent one in modern society is the nation-state.13   
Indeed, the classical nation-state model may simply no longer be the problem-
solving element. Transnational, regional, and even global entities better fit the 
dimensions of trends in economics, resources, and security. Therefore, Jessica Mathews 
notes: 
Whether the rise of nonstate actors ultimately turns out to be good news or 
bad will depend on whether humanity can launch itself on a course of 
rapid social innovation. Needed adaptations include … international 
institutions that can efficiently serve the dual masters of states and 
citizenry, and, above all, new institutions and political entities that match 
the transnational scope of today’s challenges ....14  
It is clear that states, the elementary units in the international system, feel they 
need more capable international organizations to deal with transnational challenges. Thus 
they vote for new forms of international intervention reasserting the principle how they 
interfere in their domestic affairs. They hand international organizations sweeping new 
responsibilities and then rein them in with mandates or inadequate funding.15  
The collapse of the strategic rivalry in the early 1990s uncovered many 
weaknesses in the design of the international system’s infrastructure. Private non-state 
actors seized the opportunity to fill the political and economic space that states had 
abandoned.16  
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 67. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 59. 
16 James P. Muldoon, Jr., The Architecture of Global Governance, (Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 
p. 259.  
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Samuel Huntington characterizes the world order as the interaction between the 
West17 and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. He argues 
that  
the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily 
ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind 
and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will 
remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal 
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of 
different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global 
politics.18 
Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, 
technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. 
….This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power 
necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations.19  
Above all, the international community, working through the United Nations 
(UN), has played a constructive role in encouraging reconciliation between states. The 
United Nations was originally conceived as a coalition of the nations fighting and 
winning against Germany and Japan. Soon, it became a battlefield for the Cold War. 
Today, the UN is facing several challenges in avoiding its growing marginalization. It is 
clear that this organization must find new ways to function with not only other 
international organizations but also with a number of nongovernmental actors.20     
NATO allies found themselves dealing with all consequences and asking the 
fundamental question if NATO was still needed with no Soviet threat. Thus the 1991 
NATO concept said that NATO’s policies and force posture should be adapted to the new 
geopolitical changes. Furthermore, the Washington Summit of 1999 produced a new 
strategic concept and a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) leading to the necessary 
NATO’s transformation articulated later in NATO Summit 2002 in Prague. However, the 
                                                 
17 Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American. 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993; 72, 3; 
ABI/INFORM Global p. 22. 
19 Ibid., p. 49. 
20 Rolf Ekeus, “New Challenges for the United Nations,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, 
and Pamela Aall, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washington, D.C., 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p. 517-521. 
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agenda of NATO’s future orientation will again be discussed in the next NATO Summit 
in Istanbul in the spring of 2004.  
 
B. GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES 
New security challenges emphasize the need to transform all elements of the 
security environment concerning collective defense, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. In this vein, James 
Moldoon said, “Immense changes on a global scale—some of it integrative, and some 
disintegrative—continue to unfold; new patterns of interaction are being developed; a 
global system is emerging.”21 It seemed that ”the ending of the Cold War enabled a 
considerable strengthening of the world organizations,”22  and political organization and 
commitments would likely supplant military deployments as the basic aspect of security 
arrangement. It also became clear that military power would remain relevant, but not as 
dominant as before—smaller forces would replace the large formations. The security 
adaptation and innovation were required. 
 
1. Post-Cold War Era 
The end of the Cold War brought a novel redistribution of power among states, 
markets, and civil society. Nation-states began sharing political, social, and security roles 
with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens 
groups.23 At the time, the United States was the world’s superpower with unparalleled 
global military and economic might.24 It seemed that the new, emerging system had 
nothing to fear any longer. Reasonably, it was an opportunity for the U.S. to establish a 
global cooperative order. In this vein, President George Bush envisioned the world as “a 
new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War. A partnership based on 
                                                 
21 James P. Muldoon, Jr., p. 4.    
22 Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., Approaches to Global Governance Theory, (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 13. 
23 Jessica T. Mathews, p. 50. 
24 Michael G. Schechter, “International Institutions: Obstacles, Agents, or Conduits of Global 
Structural Change?” in Innovation in Multilaterism, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999, p. 7. 
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consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially through international and 
regional organizations.”25 
However, the international system after dismantling geopolitical blocs became 
more fluid and unpredictable. In this context, Harlan Cleveland pointed out:  
The world of the 1990s and beyond is fundamentally different from 
anything in our cultural memory of international relations. No ‘power’ has 
the power to undertake on its own responsibility ‘to make the world safe 
for diversity.’ It is already apparent that a nobody-in-charge world will be 
more volatile and more crisis-prone than the potentially fatal yet eerily 
stable confrontation of nuclear-tipped superpowers glaring at each other 
from their hardened silos.26 
Indeed, early on in the post-Cold War period, the increasing number of intra-state 
conflicts27 and failed states were heavily taxing the international system’s capacity to 
respond. A new order undermined state sovereignty and the states system and was 
contributing to a sense of uncertainty and chaos in the world.28 There was a need to 
develop a new security architecture that would adapt the security relationships in 
response to the dramatically changed environment. Through a strategy of 
“engagement and enlargement” the U.S. supported an integration of democratic 
Europe cooperating with the U.S. to keep the peace and promote prosperity.29 
President Clinton’s comprehensive strategy (1995) built on the success and enduring 
value of NATO while also strengthening other institutions with a critical role to play in 
European integration. Besides accelerating NATO’s transformation, its key elements 
included enhancing the Partnership for Peace, developing a gradual, deliberate, and 
transparent process of NATO enlargement, enhancing the cooperative relationship 
between NATO and Russia, supporting European integration as embodied in the 
                                                 
25 George H. W. Bush, "The U.N.: World Parliament of Peace," address to the U.N. General 
Assembly, New York, 1 October 1990, in Dispatch (U.S. Department of State), vol. 1, No. 6, October 8, 
p. 152. 
26  Harlan Cleveland, Birth of a New World, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1993, p. 78. 
27 In places like the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) and throughout Africa (Somalia, 
Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea).  
28 James P. Muldoon, Jr., p. 261.    
29 United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, Office of International Security Affairs, June 
1995, p.8, available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/ciuniv/printdoc>, accessed 15 December 2003. 
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European Union (EU), and strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE).30 David Yost said that the end of the Cold War  
obliged the Allies to redefine NATO’s purposes and to endow it with new 
roles in addition to its traditional core missions of collective defense and 
dialogue with adversaries …. In conjunction with the pursuit of these two 
new roles the Alliance has been engaged in a complex process of internal 
adaptation. This process includes the establishment of new institutions 
intended to promote an even closer political control over military 
operations such as crisis management and peacekeeping: a certain 
‘Europeanization,’ with more attention to structural changes conducive to 
the emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI); and a 
greater flexibility for the ad hoc improvisation of effective ‘coalitions of 
the willing’ through Combined Joint Task Forces.31 
All in all, the end of the Cold War brought radical shifts in power away from 
states to non-state actors. A clear Cold War danger was replaced by potential future risks, 
imminent threats by unspecified hazards. The state-centric international order was 
coming undone as the mechanisms of cooperation and coordination among states no 
longer seemed capable of managing the rapidly expanding global agenda. Policymakers 
were thus forced to adjust NATO’s principles to the altered security conditions and to 
develop a new strategy. 
 
2. Globalization 
Globalization is a complex phenomenon producing significant political, 
economic, and social effects that marries technology to the spread of ideas.32 It results in 
great difficulty in predicting the ultimate impact on societies, both domestic and 
international. Friedman said that  
What is new is the system; what is old is power politics, chaos, clashing 
civilizations and liberalism. And what is the drama of the post-Cold War 
world is the interaction between this new system and all these old passions 
and aspirations. It is a complex drama, with the final act still not written. 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security, 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 72. 
32 Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, 
(NDU Press, 2001), Chapter 4, Robert E. Hunter, “Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics,” 
p. 109.  
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That is why under the globalization system you will find both clashes of 
civilization and the homogenization of civilizations, both environmental 
disasters and amazing environmental rescues, both the triumph of liberal, 
free-market capitalism and a backlash against it, both the durability of 
nation-states and the rise of enormously powerful nonstate actors.33  
Globalization today is having a number of effects with various risks and benefits. 
The central features of globalization are the rapid, growing, and uneven cross-border flow 
of goods, services, people, money, technology, information, ideas, culture, crime, and 
weapons. Whereas new information technologies weave the world together even tighter, 
the dynamics of globalization have eroded the core principle of the international 
system—sovereignty and security. Dennis Pirages notes that “These rapid changes in the 
human condition are increasing many kinds of insecurity, ranging from bioinvasion to 
terrorism, and now represent a major discontinuity in ongoing evolutionary processes.”34   
Foremost, globalization has contributed to the creation of fertile breeding grounds 
for terrorism. Dr. Muqtedar Khan noted, “It is ironic that global terrorism, the 
phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations simultaneously, was 
facilitated by globalization and now it has become the biggest challenge to 
globalization.”35 Transnational threats, such as international crime syndicates, terrorist 
networks, and drug cartels could continue to grow in strength and influence, thriving 
among autocratic, weak, or failed nation-states. Ethnic rivalries, nationalism, religious-
based antagonisms, and competition for scarce resources, including water, could go 
unresolved as well. Thus, a series of crises would undoubtedly arise, especially as the 
world’s population continues to grow. 
On the whole, despite its apparent positive impact on the spread of democracy and 
free-market economies, globalization redefines the international security environment, as 
well as many other aspects of human affairs. Globalization creates new threats and the 
defense against them requires more synergy and dynamism adopting a complex of 
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political, military, economic, legal and social interconnections. Potential interests 
obviously remain in building and maintaining coalitions with allies to channel the effects 
of globalization.  
 
3. September 11, 2001 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 against the United States also irrevocably 
altered the world security environment. In this regard, the National Security Strategy of 
the United States declares: 
The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like 
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong 
states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. 
Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states 
vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.36 
September 11 was also a grave alert for the international community, aiming at 
the inadequacies of the interstate system to govern a rapidly changing, globalizing world. 
“The underside of globalization had demonstrated its destructive power and ability to 
exploit the international system’s vulnerabilities,”37 Muldoon wrote. September 11 was 
not just an attack on the United States; it was an attack on the world. As a consequence, 
69 nations began supporting the global war on terrorism at the time.38  
America’s economic, military, and political reaction to the attacks has 
strengthened the United States dominance in the international system. However, some 
international responses to the acceleration of American power suggested the possibility of 
an anti-American backlash. A feeling of dependence combined with uncertainty over the 
motivations of American power bred reservations and resistance.39  
After September 11, global politics was transformed. Prior to the attacks, the 
dominant issues were geo-economic in nature. Thereafter, geopolitics and security 
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concerns have once again become the central issue.40 NATO did not become less 
important after September 11. The attacks of September 11 and a rapid and steadfast 
response proved transatlantic continuing values and NATO’s importance. Invoking 
Article 5 for the first time in its history, NATO sent a clear message that the Alliance was 
determined to react to defeat terrorism.41 However, September 11 confirmed that NATO 
must transform while facing new threats and new challenges. By this, NATO entered a 
new period of its existence evolving from the organization of collective defense to the 
organization of collective security. 
 
C. ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The goal of this part is to characterize the gravity of threats briefly as their 
potential has changed the definition of self-defense and collective security. Owing to 
their complexity, such threats cannot be fully enumerated even by intelligence services.  
History demonstrated that unexpected changes could transform the geopolitical 
landscape and new technologies could revolutionize the form and the nature of threats. 
Although the Cold War threats vanished, the world remained plagued by oppression, 
ethnic conflict, the spread of weapon technology and terrorism. Globally organized 
terrorist groups changed the international security conventions. Failed states, countries 
without a capable or responsible government that could not control their own territory or 
the actions of terrorist organizations operating within the state’s territory, deteriorated 
global security.  
The importance of regional stability emphasizes the fact that crises or 
insurgencies might destabilize some states and consequently relevant regions. Thus, an 
unpredictable development in one region could escalate to engagement in another region, 
with the implication of a global conflict. For example, the Kosovo conflict entailed a 
requirement for NATO to extend temporary protection to Macedonia and Albania. 
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Similarly, there might be several circumstances in which the use or threat of use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would have effects across regions.42  
No wonder that Western interests focus on the energy resources of the Middle 
East, a region in which several states pose conventional military challenges and many 
seek or have acquired chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high 
explosive (CBRNE) weapons. These weapons tend to extend to other unstable or 
unpredictable areas.43 
The Caucasus issue is predominant in helping the Transcaucasian states ratify 
their independence and also to expand their capacities to produce energy. Along the 
southern border of Russia, a new geostrategic context of Russo-Chinese relations is 
evolving while also extending to Central Asia and parts of the Middle East.44 
As great differences still exist among the world’s multiple regions, China, Japan, 
the United States, and other countries are all reevaluating their strategic priorities. The 
consequence may mean greater instability if events are not handled properly. Although 
still poor and internally troubled, China is achieving enormous economic gains owing to 
globalization, and India is making progress as well. As both countries gain economic 
strength, they will likely pursue traditional geopolitical goals rather than integration with 
the U.S.-led democratic community.45  
Maintaining a stable balance in Asia emphasizes the security aspect as potential 
military competitors with formidable resources may emerge in the region.46 According to 
Hunter,  
China’s status in East Asia will clearly be a major focus of both regional 
and international developments for the foreseeable future; it will also 
involve Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the 
United States. Recent diplomatic moves on the Korean Peninsula have 
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provided particular evidence of the potential for a large impact on the 
broader East Asian system.47   
While Europe is moving toward peaceful unity and Latin America is making 
progress on economic integration and political stability, Russia and its neighbors are 
falling behind the prosperous democracies because of their less adaptive political 
cultures, declining infrastructures, and distorted or incomplete market reforms.48  
Africa remains poverty-stricken, and the tradition-laden Middle East and Persian 
Gulf face economic struggles and a stressful security environment. Asia is the key, but its 
economics and security affairs may be pulling in different directions.49  
Russia at present does not pose a large-scale conventional military threat and 
shares some important security concerns with the U.S. and Europe, including the problem 
of vulnerability by ballistic missiles attacks from regional aggressors, accidental or 
unauthorized launches of strategic weapons, and the threat of international terrorism. 
However, Russia still pursues policy objectives contrary to Western interests concerning 
the potential spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.50  
New technologies and the rapid advancement of military affairs pose a danger as 
the pace and scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded all expectations. 
Likewise, the biotechnology revolution holds the probability of increasing threats as well. 
Technological advances create the potential that competitions will develop in space and 
cyber space. Space and information operations have become the backbone of networked, 
highly distributed commercial civilian and military capabilities. This opens up the 
possibility that space control will become a key objective in future military and economic 
competition. Similarly, states will likely develop offensive information operations and be 
compelled to devote resources to protecting critical information infrastructure from 
disruption.51  
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Thus, the current international security environment incorporates: first, a reality 
with the major powers and their alliances; second, regional powers operating and 
carrying out their regional conflicts; third, the failing states, civil wars and the breeding 
grounds of non-state violence and of terrorism. Religious hatred, nationalist 
confrontation, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism—each of these elements is 
dangerous enough. If these elements combine and aggravate one other, then they would 
create a new strategic threat.52   
 
D. TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION OF WMD   
The new global environment and WMD have changed the nature of terrorism and 
terrorism is changing the world. Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon in 
international affairs, it has never had as much strategic significance as nowadays. 
Whereas it was considered as a weapon of the weak, the evolution of terrorism leading to 
the use of WMD changed it to the strategic threat character.53 Technological advances 
helped to provide a potential for asymmetrical warfare—the ability of a relatively small 
power or a nonstate actor to cause destruction and hence to have a political impact.54 
Furthermore, the countries with simmering interstate and intrastate tensions that fell or 
are falling behind in the global economy could tend to support terrorism and pursue the 
development of WMD.55 Additionally, the greater ease of transportation increased the 
capacity of terrorists to act in different places. Therefore, the fear of nuclear proliferation 
related to the ability of potential actors to employ force beyond their proportions has 
become a leading factor in security environment.56 
Indeed, the potential of WMD and their possible proliferation have a significant 
impact on international security environment. In this vein, the National Security Strategy 
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of the United States declares that “mass civilian casualties are the specific objective of 
terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and 
used weapons of mass destruction.”57 The fact that eleven countries currently have 
nuclear weapons programs and thirteen more countries have been actively seeking them 
evidently defines the threat potential. Additionally, more than 25 countries now possess 
ballistic missiles, and over 75,000 cruise missiles are in existence, with the number 
expected to rise to between 80,000 and 90,000 by 2010.58 Since the number of states 
possessing ballistic missiles has increased as well as missiles’ effective ranges, the 
geographic position does not guarantee immunity from unpredictable attacks.59  
Subsequently, chemical and biological weapons will grow in importance because 
they are potentially as devastating as nuclear weapons. They are relatively cheap and easy 
to disguise within commercial ventures. Nowadays, at least, 17 countries have active 
chemical and biological weapon programs, and the number is rising.60 According to the 
Alliance’s Strategic Concept,  
Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of 
mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, 
while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-
how continues to be difficult. No doubts that non-state actors have the 
potential to create and use some of these weapons.61   
Anyway, the new terrorism has different motives, different actors, different 
sponsors and the demonstrably greater lethality. Today’s terrorists have proven very 
adaptive at learning from previous generations and changed their tactics in response to 
new anti-terrorist measures.62 Terrorists now can easily threaten as they are loosely 
organized in less hierarchical structures and can make use of amateurs to a far greater 
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extent than in the past. Therefore, the new terrorism is global, it is decentralized, it uses 
new strategies and tactics, and it is increasingly focused upon building the capacity for 
mass casualty and mass destruction attacks, in an effort to destabilize entire societal 
systems. Hence, terrorist attacks could entail the use of any imaginable weapon: 
conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and informational, individually 
or in combination. All of this complicates the task of intelligence gathering and 
counterterrorism.63  
The risk of WMD proliferation is emblematic of the new threats associated with 
globalization. WMD proliferation could give local crises a global dimension. Even 
though a global war resulting from a confrontation between competing communities 
seems less likely, global chaos resulting from a general loss of political control with 
devastating consequences does not seem impossible.64 For an illustration, President 
Bush’s 2005 budget proposal stresses the imperative to fight terrorism while calling for 
multibillion-dollar increases: “a 14.4% increase for the nearly year-old Department of 
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III. TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENT 
Established in Washington on 4th April 1949, NATO prevented Soviet 
domination of Western Europe. It helped create a political and economic cooperation 
among its members and consequently stabilized the transatlantic region. According to 
Stanley Sloan,  
the Treaty itself was based on common values, identified no enemy, 
protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all members, and was 
written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to 
accommodate changing international circumstances.66 
The Treaty provided for mutual assistance should any one member of the alliance 
be attacked. This linked the United States and particularly its nuclear power to the 
defense of Western Europe as an essential factor of deterrence. NATO was thus a product 
of the containment policy introduced by George Kennan and implemented by the 
president of the United States Harry S. Truman (1945-52) and his Secretaries of State, 
George Marshall (1947-49) and Dean Acheson (1949-52). Dean Acheson maintained that 
“the central idea of the treaty is not a static one,” and he stressed that “the North Atlantic 
Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement.”67 Consequently, the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan were aspects of the same policy that attempted to stop the spread of 
Soviet Communism and make Europe stronger. In this regard, Donald Abenheim noted: 
Europeans wanted real protection, not parasitic security and defense 
relationships that would leave them in a strategic no man’s land as in 
1919-1939 and in 1944-1946. NATO membership can finally banish the 
enduring ill effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (1939) and the Yalta 
agreements (1945) that divided Europe and prefigured the outbreak of the 
cold war in Central and Eastern Europe.68   
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The threat, the Soviet Union’s capacity to attack Western Europe, vanished 
almost immediately with the democratic revolution in Central and Eastern Europe after 
1989 when both the Warsaw Pact and the Iron Curtain disappeared. The spread of 
democracy and the free market diminished the creation of new dividing lines and 
predetermined NATO’s position as stated in the NATO Strategic Concept 1991: 
The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever 
be used except in self-defense ... The role of the Alliance’s military forces 
is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its 
member states, and thus to contribute to peace and stability in Europe.69 
The following NATO Strategic Concept 1999 updated the 1991 Strategic 
Concept to make it consistent with the new security environment. While endorsing the 
openness to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, it stressed the 
cooperation with other institutions, allies, partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries 
and the need for improving military capabilities and preparedness: 
We pledge to improve our defence capabilities to fulfill the full range of 
the Alliance’s 2lst century missions. We will continue to build confidence 
and security through arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation 
measures. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and our 
determination to protect ourselves against this scourge.70 
Hence, by emphasizing transatlantic cooperation, it was marked a new 
tendency to solving global problems. However, September 2001 was a cruel reminder 
that the world was still a dangerous place. America seized the initiative to recast global 
politics by leading a war on terrorism, yet Europe, understanding that defeat in this war 
was not an option, had to cooperate in the diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, 
humanitarian, and economic fields.71 Therefore, both sides of the Atlantic were pushed to 
create the potential for even closer cooperation within a stronger NATO and, in European 
conception, a more cooperative and unified Europe toward a more authoritative United 
Nations. 
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A. AMERICAN SECURITY STRATEGY 
The world wars and the challenge of containment doctrine compelled the US to 
build strong military and project power throughout the world. In this regard, Henry 
Kissinger stated:  
In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations 
as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States ... 
No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its 
diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral 
convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad 
even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented 
reach and scope.72 
In the first decade following the Cold War, the U.S. reduced defense 
expenditures, taking the opportunity to shift resources to other priorities. Therefore, the 
U.S. began reviewing force levels in Europe and then in 1991 began the largest 
downsizing of active duty forces permanently stationed in Europe since the 1940s. The 
reorientation of U.S. strategic deterrence away from Russia and toward proliferators of 
WMD and rogue regimes shifted U.S. policy to the Middle East. This enabled the U.S. to 
come to terms with the full implications of preventive war strategies and also raised 
questions about the relevance of nuclear deterrence as a basis for strategic relations in the 
region.73 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 and its aftermath dramatically refocused the 
U.S. priorities. As the September 2001 events demonstrated, the geographic position of 
the United States no longer guaranteed immunity from a direct attack on its population, 
territory, and infrastructure. It fundamentally changed the security context for relations 
between the United States and Europe and opened new opportunities. As a result, 
combating terrorism, rogue states, and the proliferation of WMD became the major 
overriding imperatives. 
The today United States plays the decisive role in world affairs by providing a 
world police, a global market place, a global currency, and a global example of how 
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people of different nationalities, religions, and ethnic backgrounds can live and work in a 
democratic society. Regarding this point, President George W. Bush said: 
The fellowship of generations is the cause of common beliefs. We believe 
in open societies ordered by moral conviction. We believe in private 
markets, humanized by compassionate government. We believe in 
economies that reward effort, communities that protect the weak, and the 
duty of nations to respect the dignity and the rights of all. 74  
 By the same token, as stated in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 30 
September 2001, America’s goals are to promote peace, to sustain freedom, and to 
encourage prosperity. U.S. leadership is premised on sustaining an international system 
that is respectful of the rule of law.75 That is the reason the Western civilization, led by 
the U.S., dominates the present world. 
The essence of American security policy is primarily embedded in several 
documents: the Joint Vision 2020, Quadrennial Defense Review (September 2001), 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (February 2003), National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(December 2002), and others. While the Joint Vision 2020 extends the conceptual 
template to guide the continuing transformation of America’s armed forces, the National 
Security Strategy is a strategy capable to respond terrorism effectively. It implies acting 
preemptively and globally: “America will act against such emerging threats before they 
are fully formed …. the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the 
benefits of freedom across the globe.”76 Thus, the overall goal of all concepts is the 
creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations–
persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.77  
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The United States pursues its interests globally and therefore requires an 
apparatus to implement its power dominance. The U.S. defense strategy is premised on 
efforts to strengthen America’s alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of 
security cooperation. The American commitment to these security arrangements bolsters 
the security of U.S. allies and friends. Likewise, as witnessed in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks on the United States, NATO’s invocation of Article 5 demonstrated the 
commitment of America’s partners to a collective defense, which bolstered the security 
of the United States. These mutually reinforcing security relationships underpin the 
political stability on which the prosperity of civilized nations is built. And these 
arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is 
willing and able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad.78 Provided that, 
David Yost notes,  
the U.S. will remain committed to NATO, and only because it remains the 
main institution through which America can exert influence in European 
security affairs. Simply, on geostrategic grounds, without considering 
shared values and other factors, America’s military presence in Europe is 
essential to defend US and Western economic and security interest in the 
Middle East and beyond.79 
“For the foreseeable future, the United States will almost surely remain the 
world’s dominant military power,” Robert Hunter anticipates furthermore adding that  
however, its role may be challenged militarily in niche areas. Or the 
United States could be challenged politically and economically where 
military superiority is not particularly relevant. For example, asymmetrical 
warfare need not be just about military capabilities and their application, 
but rather can be found in other areas that affect U.S. interests. Thus, there 
is rising concern about so-called cyber warfare, which would employ 
technological weapons—targeted at hardware, at software, or simply at 
processes—that in many cases should properly be seen as economic in 
character.80  
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B. EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENT 
Since the European Defense Community proposal failed in the 1950s, Europeans 
sought a European concept of common defense that was independent from NATO but 
closely coordinated. Americans have reacted with ambivalence, welcoming the notion 
that Europeans could do more in their own defense but worrying lest that effort 
undermines transatlantic ties and NATO. Europeans accepted the increasing need for 
greater European responsibilities and the development of a European security identity 
and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance. 
This in fact was accomplished in a framework anchored in NATO, the European Security 
and Defense Identity (ESDI).  
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) reflected the new European approach to the post-
Cold War developments. The process of integration was concluded with the creation of 
the European Union.81 The ideas of the common market (including an unrestricted flow 
of goods, labor, and capital) were incorporated in a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which included the eventual framing of a common defense policy. Then, the 
Europeans in Maastricht (1992) reaffirmed their goal of a ESDI—part of but apart from 
NATO—and at its Summit in April 1999 NATO and the U.S. endorsed that goal.82 
Changes in European security arrangements initiated the St. Malo Declaration 
(1998), which marked the beginning of a new chapter in relations between NATO and 
European Union. NATO members acknowledged the result of St. Malo at the April 1999 
NATO Washington Summit with the involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led 
crisis response operation. It was also agreed to address issues of assured EU access to 
NATO planning capabilities and assets as was agreed in Berlin in 1996. Thereafter, an 
important stage was reached at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where European 
Union leaders set the goal of developing a rapid reaction force by 2003. This force would 
consist of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, in addition to air and naval elements, and would be 
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deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to a year. It would be used by the 
European Union for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking—so-called the Petersberg 
tasks as agreed by the Western European Union83 in 1992. They were subsequently 
incorporated by the European Union into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.84  
The aim of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) launched by the Allies at 
Washington 1999 was to strengthen the military capabilities of all Allies, not just those of 
European Allies. Many of the needs, such as greater air and sea lift, overlap with those 
which the European Allies had to address in developing the EU rapid reaction force. The 
implementation required substantial restructuring of the armed forces and increased 
defense spending.85 Under those circumstances, Europe faced a huge problem as social 
reconstructing with relevant spending throughout the contingent was prioritized to 
security at that time. It seemed that Europe was not able and not willing to spend 
additional money on reforming the armed forces, which still possessed a Cold War 
character.   
A further progress in relations between the European Union and NATO occurred 
with the first meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU interim Political 
and Security Committee (iPSC) in Brussels in September and November 2000. 
Ambassadors highlighted issues to be reported at the upcoming EU Council meeting in 
Nice and at meetings of the NATO foreign and defense ministers in December 2000. 
Additionally, NATO provided military technical advice to the European Union’s 
Headline Goal Task Force that would be needed for the rapid reaction force, on the basis 
of proposed crisis scenarios. This prepared the way for the EU capabilities commitment 
conference held in Brussels on 20 November 2000, where 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft 
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and 100 ships were pledged to the future rapid reaction force with complementary forces 
of 15 non-EU European countries.86 
The EU-NATO arrangements of the so-called Berlin Plus enhanced the 
operational capability of the EU and provided the framework for the strategic partnership 
between both organizations in crisis management. As NATO and the European Union 
solved this problem and finally agreed to use NATO’s assets, Nicholas Burns, the U.S. 
Ambassador to NATO, commented on the achievement in the European security issues:  
In March [2003], NATO and the European Union concluded, after four 
years of often frustrating negotiations, the Berlin-Plus arrangements that 
formalize how the two organizations will work together on security 
missions. They are designed to ensure that NATO and the EU remain 
partners and not competitors as both broaden their roles. The heart of the 
deal was the EU’s agreement to use NATO assets for its missions rather 
than creating its own headquarters or military planning staff. It permits 
NATO to make our military assets, such as Shape’s prodigious planning 
capabilities, available to the EU on an if asked basis. It lays out clear 
procedures for how NATO, as the overall leader in transatlantic security 
operations, can ensure that the European Union has the support it needs. 87  
When Javier Solana, the EU Secretary General/High Representative, presented 
the European Security Strategy for adoption by the European Council, he mentioned that 
the EU aim is an effective and balanced partnership with the U.S. and this had become an 
additional reason for the EU to increase its capabilities and its coherence.88 Therefore, the 
point of the CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is to unite the 
different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European 
Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other 
instruments. Javier Solana expressed that EU made some progress toward a foreign 
policy and effective crisis management, but Europe needed to be more active in pursuing 
its strategic objectives 
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to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict 
prevention … including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade 
and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new 
dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, 
rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.89 
Indeed, security is the first condition for the European development as the EU, a 
power of 450 million people, is standing at a key turning point in its history to include ten 
new member states90 and a radical reform of its system toward a European constitution. 
However, Kilian Straus illustrates that Europe has its demographic problem and its 
weakness:  
the gap between East and West in Europe will remain considerable, both 
in economic and in administrative terms. Economic conversion is likely to 
last up to twenty years while some behavioral patterns developed in forty 
years of totalitarianism will need up to a generation to disappear. The 
inefficient administration, the related corruption, and many of the social 
issues will complicate a successful reform. The accession states’ capacity 
to adapt and the old members’ reply to the adaptation efforts will therefore 
be key measures.91  
Beyond this, the question remains whether an augmented European Union will 
ever become a political entity acting on the international stage. As the international 
system has not been well developed and always needed a strong leadership role, the 
European Union, while becoming “a major supranational innovation”92 of today will 
surely pursue its success at the global level by providing a major contribution to the 
development of a new system of global governance and ensuring that multilateral 
dialogue and the rule of law would become the pillars of international relations.93  
Then, given this point, Peter van Ham and Richard Kugler assert, 
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Europe has to convince America that its efforts to shape a credible CFSP 
and ESDP—both of which are required for the EU to take on more 
responsibility in the foreign policy, security, and defense areas—are not 
meant to balance America in any way, but are mainly to establish Europe 
as a credible and useful ally of the United States working toward a 
generally shared goal, but occasionally taking different routes. At times 
friction and modest disagreement will occur, but such a strong European 
voice is required to keep ‘the West’ both dynamic and credible to the rest 
of the world. Europe has to think for itself and be honest in its relationship 
with the United States. The result, inevitably, will be a more balanced 
NATO and a United States willing to listen to its traditional allies, not 
with aversion and displeasure, but as the useful and constructive voices 
that they are, or at least should strive to become.94 
 
C. TRANSATLANTIC DILEMMA 
The U.S.-European relationship has not been fully harmonized as it had been 
several times at historic crossroads. For example, the Suez Crisis and Vietnam were 
bitter, as was President De Gaulle’s decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO’s 
integrated military structure as well as the 1979 Two-Track Pershing Missile decision 
that eventually led to the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe.95 
Moreover, a confident and strong United States had to face an indecisive Europe 
searching for its own role and identity. In addition, politically, strategically, and even 
culturally, the United States and Europe also appeared to be slowly drifting apart as 
demonstrated by tangible differences on the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), the Ottawa Treaty—banning anti-personnel landmines, and the ABM treaty.  
Under the threat from the Nazis and then Soviet Communism, America and 
Europe were united by a common threat. There was never total unity, but both sides of 
the Atlantic were united in a common effort. However, in the early years of the Cold 
War, the European economies were too weak to support sufficient military capacity for 
self-defense. But even when the European economies recovered later in the Cold War, 
the Europeans were not especially interested in closing differences in the burden sharing 
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process. Moreover, the American nuclear guarantee deprived Europeans of the incentive 
to spend the kind of money that would have been necessary to restore their military 
power.  
The end of the Cold War changed the dynamic of the American-European 
relationship. Operation Allied Force over Kosovo brought disillusions unveiling the 
growing gap in military capabilities between Europe and the United States.96 It became 
clear that the capabilities could not be raised to U.S. levels without spending far more 
than most Europeans were prepared to pay. 97  
After September 11, many NATO Europeans were dissatisfied with the small role 
that the Alliance played in the response to the terrorist attacks and attributed it to U.S. 
unilateralism and arrogance.  
The crisis over Iraq immensely worsened the transatlantic relations. There were 
two primary disagreements whether Iraq should have been categorized as a problem of 
terrorism, and whether the U.S. has had the right to take action in Iraq without explicit 
authorization from the UN Security Council. The fact that Turkey could have a request 
for mutual defense assistance, based on a common threat (Article 4), turned down by the 
Alliance had seriously damaged NATO’s credibility among U.S. legislators. Since 
Belgium, France, and Germany initially denied Turkey’s routine request for NATO assets 
to defend against a possible Iraqi attack, the Alliance had to alter its decision to reach 
agreement on supporting Turkey.98  Additionally, the French worried that war would 
increase Islamist terrorism, not decrease it. They argued that the United States’ virtually 
abandoning efforts to stop the Israel-Palestinian conflict was grist to the terrorists’ mill. 
They were skeptical that democracy could be brought to post-war Iraq, at least not 
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without costly and sustained U.S. and European engagement for years if not decades.99 
Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, explained:   
We did not agree on whether the reasons were actually sufficient, on what 
consequences the war would have for the fight against international 
terrorism and for regional stability and on whether the consequences of the 
war were controllable.100 
The European response to the war on terrorism and approach to the Iraqi 
campaign was a reflexive insistence on the primacy of international law. There was a 
broad agreement that the law of war need to be changed.101 Likewise, the Europeans 
tended to view the U.S. national security strategy as a broad attack on global rules and 
institutions applying power as a potentially destabilizing factor. They believed that 
Western ideas were best guaranteed by clear rules of behavior, represented by 
international law—military power destabilized the system by inciting fear and insecurity, 
and thus undermining the global community’s confidence in peaceful cooperation.102  
In addition, some Europeans (France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg) 
initiated a counterweight to the United States. They wanted to create a new EU military 
headquarters despite the fact that “Berlin Plus” guaranteed that the European Union 
would be helped by NATO to develop its own strength and unity as a defensive and 
security force. Simply, they sought to duplicate what Europeans and Americans had built 
over five decades. America absolutely rejected this aspiration and stressed its will to 
maintain an alliance and partnership in one transatlantic relationship.103 
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Americans always observed with distrust an intensive debate in Europe about 
security issues. A concept prevailed that the EU was a troubled and troubling union: 
troubled in terms of its internal divisions, and troubling in terms of the motivation that 
seemed to underline the actions of its older members. As an example, Robert Kagan 
claimed that Americans perceived Europeans as so focused on the EU current 
institutional agenda that they failed to see imminent threats accordingly.104 If Europe had 
produced a serious security strategy earlier, it would have given the European Union far 
greater leverage and credibility.105  
Europe finally agreed on the nature and scale of threats to the continent after 
delaying to define its own foreign-policy strategy following September 11 events. 
However, there are some fundamental structural shortcomings, namely the process of 
forming political will, institutional implementation, and military capabilities in the 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy. There are also some fears that the 
increasing institutionalization of the European Security and Defense Policy will lead to 
duplication and will even weaken NATO.106  
Anyway, the U.S. retains global security interests, and Europe remains evidently a 
continent of much diversity with some countries pursuing their traditional and habitual 
ways. Seeing that, some Americans viewed NATO as a fading organization with a 
blocking minority of members who were not only unwilling but also broadly incapable 
and frankly irrelevant.107 As the U.S. military moved toward rapid, fundamental, 
transformation of its combat capabilities, its European allies committed less resource for 
creating change. Moreover other factors hindered their defense development.  
Above all, the security and prosperity of the rest of the world have depended on 
the transatlantic cooperation and vice versa. Also, this security and prosperity have been 
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impeded by transatlantic discord. Therefore, the only way to keep the transatlantic 
partnership from sliding into irrelevance is for Europe to become a serious partner of 
America. Likewise, the leaders of France and Germany have called for an agreement to 
end the wrangling over the EU constitution by the end of June 2004.108  
In the coming years, the fight against international terrorism will remain the key 
point on the West’s security agenda. But, the main danger will not come from extremists 
with dirty nuclear devices. The main problem will be if “the West” as a cohesive bloc and 
single-minded political force ceases to exist. Thus, the current debates of a “transatlantic 
community of values,” the ideas that originated during the 20th century are still vividly 
sound concerns. In this regard, Joschka Fischer said: 
We can only have stable transatlantic relations if the two pillars of this 
bridge across the North Atlantic are able to bear more or less the same 
burden …. Not a strong European pillar but a weak one would pose a 
threat to NATO. And only a strong European pillar can guarantee 
Europe’s partnership in the transatlantic alliance.109 
By the same token, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated:  
it is time to put the differences of the past behind us.  It is time to get back 
to business. The transatlantic community has realised that we have no 
more time to waste. That there are simply too many threats on the horizon, 
too many challenges for us to tackle. Terrorism, the threat of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are confronting us with new 
and unprecedented strategic environment.  Transatlantic cooperation is the 
most effective way to meet these challenges. Open security dialogue 
among likeminded Allies, and profound security cooperation in the 
framework of NATO are the best ways to balance the burden of getting 
the job done and to get the best bang for our buck.110                    
To sum, the differences that split the Alliance in 2003 were profound and 
NATO’s future was at a turning point. However, disagreements among Allies are normal, 
and they are part of the mutual relationship. NATO has survived every crisis by adapting 
to changing times and it remains flexible to sustain different points of view.  
                                                 
108 NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), 10 February 2004. 
109 Joschka Fischer 
110 NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004, 
NATODOC, available at: <http://listserv.cc.kuleuven.ac.be/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0402&L=natodata>, 
accessed 10 February 2004. 
35 
Europeans and North Americans are still the most like-minded peoples on the 
planet in how they view the world, how they organize politically as democracies, and 
how they see current and future threats. Terrorism and WMD, international crime, 
narcotics flows, human trafficking, global climate change, AIDS and others—these are 
the challenges they must be faced on a multilateral basis through international 
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IV. NATO’S CURRENT ROLE AND SECURITY INTEREST 
The continuing interest of all the Allies consists in sustaining NATO and adapting 
it to the new strategic environment. So, the goal of this chapter is to provide a review of 
the Alliance’s main role and stress the fact that NATO had to accept a new conceptual 
foundation and undergo a resolute change.  
Today, the Alliance is a major security organization and transatlantic allies are 
not only international aid and developmental assistance donors throughout the world, 
but they also play leading roles in the major world institutions and in developing the 
tools needed to shape the international community. Furthermore, the U.S. leadership 
on European security issues not only shapes allied views toward a consensus on the 
main defense issues, it also facilitates cooperation and gives the U.S. leverage in other 
important forums.112 
NATO remains fundamentally focused on meeting the security commitments 
outlined in its founding document, the Washington Treaty. Stephen Hadley, U.S. Deputy 
National Security Adviser, stated:  
 NATO’s core mission is the same today as it was at its founding: 
collective defense and consultation about threats to peace and security. 
NATO put this mission into new practice following the 11 September 
terrorist attacks …. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty became real that day in 
a new way, and one that should surely give pause to those who question 
NATO’s purposes. NATO’s core mission has not changed. What has 
changed is the source of the threats to our countries.113  
NATO can only successfully counter these new threats if the transatlantic allies 
create a long-term plan to tackle this strategic task together, on the basis of their common 
values, interests and the successful transatlantic tradition of the last few decades. In this 
context, Joschka Fisher declared:   
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Here lies the common transatlantic interest and the necessity for a new 
NATO in the 21st century. NATO will remain one of the key cornerstones 
for peace and stability …. Europe and America depend upon each other in 
their fight against the new threat. We are in the same boat because we 
want to defend the same thing: the freedom and security of our citizens, as 
well as our open democracies and human rights. These are the goals which 
we are both pursuing. These are the values which we share. 114 
Indeed, America’s and Europe’s common values and interests in combating 
terrorism, in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in supporting 
economic growth and global stability, and moreover, in combating endemic disease, and 
in preventing failed states and regional conflicts have never been more closely aligned.115 
Then, NATO is a central security pillar of transatlantic security, the guarantor of 
European stability, a mechanism for American engagement in Europe and also for 
dampening American and also European isolationist sentiments.116  
 
A. NATO SECURITY TASKS AND OBJECTIVES 
NATO is a collective defense system. As cited in the NATO’s basic document, 
“NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its 
members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty 
and the principles of the United Nations Charter.”117 
The fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common 
commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on 
the indivisibility of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within the 
Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to rely upon its own 
national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without 
depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign 
responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realise 
their essential national security objectives through collective effort. In 
short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their 
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determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and 
stable relations with other countries. 118 
 NATO provides one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic 
security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to 
the peaceful resolution of disputes. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance serves, 
“as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for 
Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible 
developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of 
their efforts in fields of common concern.”119 To deter and defend against any threat of 
aggression against any member state declares Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington 
Treaty, which contributes to effective conflict prevention and crisis management 
solution, including crisis response operations. Additionally, an important factor 
increasing transparency and mutual confidence represents a wide-ranging partnership, 
cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.120  
The other aspect of the NATO’s significance is much related to economic and 
trade ties. Secured by NATO’s protective umbrella, trade works in favor of the strong 
partnership between the U.S. and Europe and totals over $1 billion daily.121 In this vein, 
the President of the European Commission stressed “how deeply intertwined the 
European Union and the United States actually are. Together the US and the EU 
command almost 40% of world trade, which underlines the scale of our joint 
responsibility for the world economy.”122 
Following military operations in Afghanistan and cooperation with Russia, NATO 
was observed as becoming more of a political organization. According to Stanley Sloan, 
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“NATO has been and always will be a political as well as a military alliance.”123 
NATO’s activities make clear that its role is as an instrument of both political and 
military cooperation consisting in consultations in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and 
its subordinate bodies, practical coordination in the Military Committee, and day-to-day 
collaboration in the Integrated Command Structures.124  
David Yost noted, “The most serious dilemmas and risk reside in the Alliance’s 
attempt to combine elements of collective security with collective defense.”125 Yost said 
In the debate over NATO’s new functions, some conceptual obscurity has 
emerged at times. As is customary, Secretary of Defense Cohen used the 
expression “collective defense” in his April 1997 testimony to refer to the 
defense of the Allies against external threats. However, he used the 
expression “cooperative security” to refer to efforts to support the 
“stability of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” and at 
another point he alluded to “collective security”: “NATO’s basic prin-
ciples of democracy, consensus and collective security are not a threat to 
Russia.”126 
In order to distinguish whether NATO is a system of collective defense or 
collective security, Sloan argues that NATO was designed as a system of cooperation to 
deal with challenges and problems originating outside that system, not within it, and it 
does not have legal responsibility for collective security in Europe—the North Atlantic 
Treaty does not suggest such a role. In fact, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)127 was designed to promote peaceful relations among 
states as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act established principles to govern relations among 
states in Europe. Thus, according to Sloan, NATO is not a collective security 
organization because 
it is designed primarily not to keep peace among its members but rather to 
protect and advance the interests of the members in dealing with the world 
around them. But some of NATO’s activities contribute to the goal of 
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collective security, helping maintain peaceful and cooperative relations 
among all states in Europe.128 
In fact, NATO now is engaged in a system based on cooperative security. NATO 
has used the anti-terrorism campaign to strengthen ties with partners within the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Program (EAPC), and with Russia. Consequently, giving Russia 
more influence in the NAC and enlarging NATO with seven other countries is altering 
the nature and role of the Alliance from a classic, transatlantic, collective defense 
organization, to something of a different quality.129  
 
B. NATO IS UP TO THE CHALLENGE 
Among all the consequences, the divide between the external and internal 
dimensions of security has been transformed. Richard Lugar, the U.S. Senator, speaking 
in Brussels, characterized a primary objective of security cooperation to help create 
favorable defense:   
The threat we face is global and existential. We need allies and alliances to 
confront it effectively. Those alliances can no longer be circumscribed by 
artificial geographic boundaries. All of America’s alliances are going to be 
reviewed and recast in light of this new challenge, including NATO. If 
NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war 
against terrorism, then our political leaders may be inclined to search for 
something else that will answer this need.130 
Despite the fact that NATO is the most institutionalized alliance with experience 
in fostering close ties among its members, the United States chose not to use NATO to 
organize its alarm response to the September 11 attacks. The response occurred primarily 
on a bilateral, and not a multilateral, basis. Moreover, NATO was unable to provide 
substantial capabilities that would override U.S. concerns about using the NATO 
machinery. Therefore the U.S. decided to retain sole command authority in Afghanistan.  
The frustration among the Allies about the U.S. unilateral intervention to 
Afghanistan was soon replaced by determination to transform NATO. Giving the United 
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States unconditional political support through the invocation of Article 5, the allies 
conceived that NATO’s model of an enemy by the Cold War scenario and old procedures 
did not fit the new circumstances. Then, Lord Robertson declared that terrorism would be 
the key security challenge in the 21st century:  
Since terrorism is global in nature, NATO’s response must be global as 
well. NATO and its members must expand its responsibility as an essential 
platform for defence cooperation to become the primary means for 
developing the role of armed forces in helping to defeat the terrorist 
threat.131 
He further identified four areas where NATO could play such a role: 1) in the 
timely identification and detection of terrorist threats; 2) in the protection of civilian and 
military infrastructure and populations; 3) in the management of the consequences of 
possible future terrorist attacks; and 4) by preparing for preemptive military action. Lord 
Robertson stressed that, “Military strikes against terrorists and their networks are often 
the only effective option to prevent further damage.”132 The U.S. military action in 
Afghanistan proved this point for NATO to emulate.133   
Likewise, General Klaus Naumann, the former chairman of NATO’s Military 
Committee, warned that NATO was in danger of outliving its utility, unless urgent steps 
were taken to revitalize the Alliance:  
The problem is the apparent transatlantic divergence in perceptions of 
NATO. European Allies see NATO as a collective-defence and crisis-
management organisation, whereas the United States, its most powerful 
and indeed indispensable member, no longer looks at the Alliance as the 
military instrument of choice to use in conflict and war …. If NATO were 
to become an essentially political organisation and no longer be used in a 
crisis, its defence guarantee would look hollow and it would soon lose 
support and fade away. This would not only be disastrous for Europe but a 
severe blow to US national interests as well. The United States would risk 
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losing control of one of its opposing coastlines and relinquishing one of its 
most powerful instruments of political influence on Europe.134 
General Naumann’s observation resulted in determination that NATO had to be 
transformed into a global Alliance, ready to defend its member countries’ interests 
wherever they were at risk and able to act as the core of future ad hoc coalitions of the 
willing. Command and force structures would need to be adapted accordingly and the 
necessary capabilities acquired. Deployability and mobility should have been the guiding 
principles for adapting NATO’s command structure, which should have included 
establishing at least two Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), enabling assets to be 
pooled, and setting up multinational component forces. Modernization efforts should 
have focused on improving capabilities that were crucial for the operational readiness of 
the CJTFs. Other key areas were that of command, control, communications and 
computing, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) around which all 
other capabilities necessary to implement the revolution in military affairs could have 
been built.135  
All in all, the Alliance obtained a task with the responsibility to continue 
broadening its focus beyond members’ territory to address the instability and threats 
posed by terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles—in North Africa and 
the Middle East and beyond, if the situation required it. Seeking new ways to organize 
itself in a new system, NATO recognized needs to be able, at short notice, to deploy 
flexible, well-armed forces capable of conducting sustained operations across a range of 
military operations. In this context, the U.S. President George W. Bush said that NATO 
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1. Conducting Out-of-Area Operations 
Permanent debates concerning the out-of-area mandate have existed since the 
NATO’s birth. Practically, out-of-area security concerns had been at the center of NATO 
policy as its involvement, in terms of intelligence, evaluation, consultation, coordination, 
and cooperation, deterred Soviet aggression against the territory of its members. 
According to Elizabeth Sherwood, 
Paradoxically, because of its effectiveness within the European theater, 
most of the major crises bearing on the interests of the Atlantic allies have 
taken place beyond Europe. There has never been a proverbial golden 
moment when NATO was insulated from developments outside its 
boundaries or from the interests of its individual members in those 
developments. As a result, alongside the NATO … is a shadow alliance, 
an informal, globally oriented partnership of Western nations. This 
shadow alliance has played a critical role in protecting the allies’ global 
interests.137 
Indeed, the out-of-area dimension of alliance politics has been documented by 
several examples of fractious disputes over Indochina (1949-54), Suez (1956), North 
Africa (1954-62), Portuguese Africa (1961-75), Vietnam (the mid-1960s), and Libya 
(1986). Ian Thomas mentioned, “Though out-of-area concerns had been of great 
importance since NATO’s founding, the term ‘out-of-area’ formally entered the alliance 
lexicon only in 1980.”138 At issue was the geographic reach of the alliance, pre-
conditionality of membership, the right of imperial domain, and false expectations.  
NATO members attempted to bridge disagreements over geographic boundaries 
by attempting to cast the menace in global terms: 
Concern about the global nature of the Soviet threat contributed to the 
decision by the signatory governments to include in the final treaty a 
clause of the treaty, which clearly stipulates the boundaries of the alliance, 
and Article 4, which commits the signatory governments to consultation 
whenever the ‘territorial integrity, political independence, of any of the 
parties is threatened’...139 
                                                 
137 Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security, (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 1. 
138 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, (Boston: 
Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 128. 
139 Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949, 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 96.. 
45 
There is a whole gamut. Actions taken in out-of-area crises have often ranged 
from consensual statements of moral support to polite but benign neglect. Perhaps the 
most glaring example was the April 1986 decision taken by the U.S. Government to 
initiate retaliatory military measures against Libya for its terror attacks on American 
troops stationed in Germany.140  
NATO’s out-of-area management emerged repeatedly and in different 
permutations. Three factors shaped the Alliance politics beyond Europe: “competing 
definitions of allied out-of-area interests, divergent views about the appropriate allocation 
of human and material resources, and marked inequalities in the distribution of power 
within NATO.”141  
Those allies with interests at stake outside Europe attempted to identify their own 
concerns with those of the alliance. However, NATO’s principal powers—the U.S., 
United Kingdom, and France—carefully guarded their independence refusing to be 
bound by the other NATO partners’ commitments. Therefore, the allies were  
interested in cooperation if it was tantamount to support for their national 
policies, but not if joint action would constrain their chosen course. This 
put a damper on efforts to formalize allied obligations beyond the treaty 
area and forced the allies to rely on alternative means of policy 
coordination outside Europe.142 
Nevertheless, periodic attempts to solve the out-of-area problem existed to 
formalize allied cooperation by expanding NATO’s domain or creating new forums for 
consultation and policy coordination. In fact, NATO avoided formal cooperation beyond 
Europe,  
fearing that it would overburden the partnership and unnecessarily limit 
the autonomy of its members. Instead, the allies have relied on an ad hoc, 
informal approach to the management of developments outside the treaty 
area. The organizing principle has been that members with the interest, the 
will, and the capability to take action beyond Europe in defense of 
Western interests should do so, and that, where possible, they should 
coordinate with one another. Most often, this kind of cooperation has 
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taken place on a bilateral basis outside the NATO framework. The 
nonbinding nature of this arrangement has given the Atlantic alliance the 
flexibility necessary to manage a wide variety of global challenges to the 
interests of its members and, ultimately, to endure. 143 
In the late 1990s, when questioned on the legality of the out-of-area mandate 
Tony Lloyd, the British Secretary of State said that NATO considered each operation on 
a case-by-case basis. He added that a UN mandate would not be needed in every instance. 
However, it was inconceivable that NATO would break international law. Therefore, at 
the time the British Defense Minister George Robertson stated that non-Article 5 
missions needed to be incorporated into the revised NATO strategic concept. He drew on 
the example of Bosnia and Kosovo to demonstrate this as a “pragmatic role that has a 
legal mandate.” However, he emphasized that Article 5 must remain at the core of the 
concept. He added that possible legal bases for military action would be the UN Charter, 
UN Security Council Resolutions and the OSCE mandate.144 
Article 6 of the Treaty precisely and explicitly limits the scope of allied action. 
However, The Alliance‘s Strategic Concept of 1999 foresaw that “Military capabilities … 
are also the basis of the Alliance’s ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis 
management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations.“145 
The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to 
guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of 
member states. The Alliance’s forces must therefore be able to deter and 
defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied 
nations and—in case of conflict—to terminate war rapidly by making an 
aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO 
forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while 
conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.146 
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The Alliance’s Strategic Concept of 1999 thus confirmed the out-of-area role 
through the non-Article 5 crisis response operations as a contribution to some collective 
defense missions.147 
The NATO’s Balkan missions, the most intense and sustained military operations 
in Europe since World War II, represented the first extended use of force by NATO as 
well as the first major combat operations conducted for humanitarian objectives. “For the 
first time in history, NATO today is operating beyond its borders in support of crisis 
management and peacekeeping. We have abolished the old distinction between in-area 
and out-of-area,”148 said NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in October 1993. He 
echoed the sentiments of those like U.S. Senator Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee who called for NATO to go “out-of-area or out-of-business.” 
The trends toward out-of-area issue reflected NATO Secretary General Lord 
Robertson while examining the significance of the Prague Summit 2002 and considering 
the challenges ahead: 
First of all, we have reached agreement on the character of the new threats 
and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. 
Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are two of 
the defining challenges of the 21st century. The NATO Allies 
acknowledged this by invoking Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks. 
And they did so again by sending forces to Afghanistan to fight al Qaida 
and the Taliban. As a result, in 2002, we effectively buried the perennial 
debate on whether NATO could or should go “out-of-area.”149 
Certainly, NATO operations, such as IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR were tests for out-
of-area and non-Article 5 missions and they were watershed events for NATO in the 
post-Cold War era. As a matter of fact, it was the lesson of September 11 that the gravest 
threats could come from anywhere on the globe. NATO’s reactions were thus the defense 
of peace not just in Europe but wherever threats arose. In fact, in August 2003 NATO 
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officially assumed the command, coordination, and planning of the real out-of-area 
mission—the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan.150  
Then, NATO now operating well beyond the borders of member states definitely 
responded to the permanent debate of “out-of-area” issue. No wonder NATO began the 
global aspiration to be a model for the new global security architecture. 
 
2. NATO’s Current Operations and Lessons Learned 
The Balkans lessons helped NATO recognize its weaknesses and established its 
virtue ahead. Now, the time has come to replace NATO troops in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia by an EU mission, but Kosovo and the Balkans as a 
whole still need the stabilizing presence of NATO. Especially in Kosovo, NATO 
conducts a broad range of essential peacekeeping duties largely on its own.151  
The political basis for the Alliance’s role in the former Yugoslavia was 
established at the NAC meeting in Oslo, June 1992. NATO announced the readiness to 
support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of 
OSCE.152 After the ethnic cleansing and other atrocities developed in Kosovo, it became 
evident that NATO’s failure to end a brutal war had a profound impact on both, the 
alliance’s viability and the credibility of the United States. The NAC meeting thus stated: 
The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for 
which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, 
ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade regime under the 
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direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror 
to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.153 
The conflict in Kosovo and action taken by NATO thereafter generated plenty of 
questions and opened a new period in international relations. Legitimate criticism of how 
the campaign was conducted—too great a US and too small a European contribution—
dominated the public image so much that the most important issue was almost lost in the 
debate.154 As the air campaign brought about some disillusion, the Secretary General of 
NATO, Lord Robertson asserted: 
NATO launched its airpower to end the repression in Kosovo—and 
succeeded. In the blizzard of words that has followed it is easy to overlook 
that simple fact. Much is still misunderstood about what happened. Now is 
an appropriate time to look back on what NATO did during the conflict, to 
review what KFOR has achieved since, and to look ahead. The risks were 
high—–NATO faced many problems—and the price was high. But as the 
Alliance promised at the time, Serb forces are out, KFOR is in, and the 
refugees are home. However, there should be no illusions—the task 
remaining is formidable.155  
In fact, General Wesley Clark said:  
In the darkest days before the NATO 50th anniversary summit in late 
April in Washington, British Prime Minister Tony Blair came to our 
headquarters in Belgium on very short notice. To be honest, it wasn’t 
altogether clear why he was coming. But as he and I sat alone in my 
office, it quickly became apparent. “Are we going to win?” he asked me. 
“Will we win with an air campaign alone? Will you get ground troops if 
you need them?” Blair made it very clear that the future of every 
government in Western Europe, including his own, depended on a 
successful outcome of the war. Therefore, he was going to do everything it 
took to succeed. That was the real lesson of the Kosovo campaign at the 
highest level: NATO worked.156 
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If NATO is to continue to play a constructive role in the effort to bring enduring 
peace to the Balkans, two important lessons from the Balkan tragedy must be heeded. 
First, the early hesitation of the Allies to act in response to the crisis on Bosnia cost many 
lives in Yugoslavia and probably has cost the Allies much more financially and militarily 
than the earlier political-military intervention would have. Second, the experience in 
Kosovo suggests that NATO should only threaten military intervention when the Allies 
are willing and clearly prepared to fulfill those threats. Empty threats only undermine the 
effectiveness of NATO’s policies and, more broadly, the long-term credibility of the 
Alliance. 
The results from the Kosovo campaign made it painfully clear that Europe 
depended upon American military capabilities. However, it also underlined that the U.S. 
leadership in Europe was tenuous and that most Americans were unwilling to risk messy 
European conflicts in which their national interests were hardly at stake. The lesson for 
Europeans was evident: the United States remained crucial for the maintenance of the 
continent as long as Europe lacked the willingness to assume more responsibility for its 
own defense. The lesson of Kosovo, therefore, stimulated a rethinking of European 
defense cooperation.157  
NATO after Kosovo faced the challenge to reorganize and re-equip its forces to 
make them more flexible, more mobile and more effective. Additionally, Kosovo marked 
a turning point for Europe acknowledging that violence and conflict were no longer 
acceptable in the new Europe and beyond its periphery.158  
On the other hand, the Kosovo air campaign undertaken without UN authorization 
affected the stage for the American doctrine of “preemption.” In a sense, this level of 
agreement within the UN (all available means) was generally supportive of the initial 
American response to the September 11 attacks, acquiescing in the initiation of the 
Afghanistan campaign. The NATO air campaign also represented a beginning of the 
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future face of war—the long-distance, high-tech application of force served as an 
attractive template as the United States and other nations become ever more casualty-
averse.  
Indeed, the Kosovo air campaign was the first major operation in which aircraft 
achieved victory without the need for a land campaign. It really encouraged airpower en-
thusiasts for sophisticated air attacks and encouraged militaries to implement other steps 
in RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). NATO’s commander for Europe, General 
James Jones said that Kosovo was a “test-bed” of reforms designed to make the Atlantic 
alliance smarter and more flexible.159 
Nowadays, NATO is planning to reduce the number160 of peacekeepers securing 
Kosovo. The new unit, Multinational Task Force, will focus on intelligence-based 
operations and rely on more mobile troops to secure the region. “The methods will be 
different and they will involve intelligence-led operations, greater flexibility and 
mobility,” said Brannstrom, the brigadier general in charge.  
Following the Operation Enduring Freedom (the US-led coalition fighting the war 
on terrorism) and the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, NATO in August 2003 took 
command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)161 in Kabul. The ISAF 
operation is linked to the most important issues facing NATO today: transformation, 
enlargement, terrorism, and burden sharing. ISAF serves as a test of NATO’s ability and 
capability to live up to the promises of the Prague Summit of November 2002 when 
NATO resolved to meet “the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 
21st century .… to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed … to 
sustain operations over distance and time … and to achieve their objectives.”162  
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ISAF is a milestone for NATO because it tests the NATO’s ability to function 
without the U.S. major assistance. NATO’s ability to follow through on the mission, its 
first outside of Europe, has become a crucial test for the alliance. Although the United 
States is still financing a substantial portion of the ISAF costs, European countries lead 
and provide the majority of the manpower and assess the coordination mechanisms 
between NATO and the EU.  
The importance of ISAF’s success stressed Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO 
Secretary General. He expressed concerns that those who want to win the anti-terror war 
must not lose Afghanistan. The solution is to extend the NATO presence beyond the 
capital, Kabul, both politically and militarily.163 “NATO’s first priority is to get 
Afghanistan right,” 164 said Scheffer. Expanding beyond the capital is crucial not only to 
provide greater security in the provinces but also to extend the authority of the Afghan 
government. However, NATO has had difficulty mustering enough troops and equipment 
from member nations to fulfill this commitment. While U.S. forces are concentrated in 
southern and eastern Afghanistan where Taliban and al Qaeda fighters remain a threat, 
plans call for the NATO teams to move into the relatively calm north and west.165   
The risk to ISAF represents the over-commitment as the Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is now responsible for the command, control, 
coordination, and planning additionally for SFOR, KFOR. In addition, NATO member 
nations are involved in a number of smaller scale operations in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the war on terrorism. A successful ISAF mission—minimal 
casualties, few integration problems among participating nations, and no last minute 
American help— would surely yield several important benefits for NATO.  
The ISAF mission bears virtually no resemblance to NATO’s operations in the 
Balkans. Whereas the mission of IFOR, and subsequently SFOR and KFOR, required 
NATO troops to separate warring factions and to implement the General Framework 
Agreement (the Dayton Peace Accords), the ISAF mission by contrast is focused                                                  
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primarily on providing security for UN operations in Kabul. ISAF also speaks for the 
testing of the strategic airlift and force projection capabilities as the area of operation is 
the most distant NATO out-of-area operation. Despite these differences, the two missions 
are indicative of what NATO must be prepared to execute next. Future scenarios will 
require expeditionary forces to operate in semi-permissive environments for extended 
durations to provide security for humanitarian and civil-military cooperation.  
First and foremost, a successful ISAF could portray the vision of a transformed 
Alliance as forecast at the NATO Prague Summit. Moreover, it is the first real out-of-area 
mission and the first operational mission to integrate new member states plus a few 
potential member states. Successfully executing the ISAF without a substantial U.S. 
involvement may help diminish the burden-sharing debate. To the European benefit, it 
could be proof that they have learned the lessons of Kosovo and are now actively 
engaged outside Europe.  
 
C. REVISITING NATO’S ROLE  
After the Balkans’ lessons, it became clear that NATO had to be shaped into an 
effective multilateral military instrument. In this context, Giovanna Bono said: 
It has been demonstrated that there were shifting ‘policy communities’ 
whose members were consistently at the forefront in seeking to give 
NATO an ‘out-of-area’ role. Although these policy-makers were partly 
moved by a desire to end the sufferings in the Balkans, they were 
simultaneously seeking to resolve complex domestic and transatlantic 
‘burdensharing’ issues. The Alliance’s role in the Balkans was therefore 
never purely driven by the fear of an external threat or by humanitarian 
concerns.166 
Since the events of September 11 and its aftermath, NATO has again been 
unintentionally entangled in a process to redefine its role in the international arena. 
Enlargement became the cornerstone of its new posture, which aimed to adapt to the 
security environment and replace its aging Cold War static defense-oriented posture with 
a new, more flexible one. Thus, the Allies could not have credibility throughout the Euro-
Atlantic region unless NATO’s effectiveness was improved. In a like manner, Lord 
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Robertson, a former NATO Secretary General, stated, “NATO must change radically if it 
is to be effective … It must modernize or be marginalized.”167 
Indeed, when the U.S. went alone in Afghanistan, it raised fears that the Alliance 
became marginalized. Therefore, European NATO acknowledged the need to focus on its 
military capabilities and a more equal partnership cooperating with the United States. 
However, Europeans always demanded protection under the UN framework. In context, 
David Yost said,  
Moreover, as the Allies recognized in the Kosovo crisis, depending on the 
UN Security Council as the only entity capable of legitimizing an 
intervention in support of collective security could hamper the Alliance’s 
ability to act in cases in which the gravity of the injustice and the 
magnitude of the threat to Allied interests demand immediate action.168 
Evidently, the new security environment insisted not only on transforming the 
Alliance, but also on all interconnecting factors, structures and organizations, such as the 
UN. Additionally, a serious risk of a “hollowing out” of NATO appeared. The fact was 
provoked by the differential rates of force modernization, especially in taking full 
advantage of developments in high technology. The fact that tomorrow’s U.S. forces 
might be unable to fight in collaboration with allied forces remaining stuck at today’s 
technological levels horrified NATO officials.169 By the same token, Lord Robertson 
argued in February 2002 that the  
huge additional investment [the United States] is making in defence will 
make practical interoperability with Allies, in NATO or in coalitions, 
impossible. The gap between American forces on the one hand and 
European and Canadian forces on the other will be unbridgeable. For 
Washington, the choice could become: act alone or not at all. And that is 
no choice at all.170 
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 Then, Robertson offered two solutions. First, European countries have to spend 
more on security and defense, both individually and within the ESDP. For Europe, he 
argued, the choice should be modernization. Second, the US government should relax the 
stringent export control regulations on technology transfers for its European allies, 
offering them at least part of the benefits of the American RMA.171 
In fact, it was questionable whether European countries would be able and willing 
to catch up with the American RMA. Europe had failed to invest in the newest 
developments in military technology and cashed its post-Cold War peace dividends. 
Europe lagged behind in adapting commercial high-tech to military purposes and had not 
formulated and integrated a joint military strategy based on these high-tech defense 
capabilities. Therefore, Europe remained far removed from the US level of 
sophistication.172 
Speaking in Berlin on 24 June 2003, NATO Secretary General mentioned again 
that European NATO members were “still spending too much on cold war legacy 
capabilities and unnecessary prestige projects, and not enough on what really matters 
today.” He stressed that this could open a “growing disconnect” between what Europe’s 
aspirations were and what it could actually deliver.173 Thus, he again immensely urged 
both to solve the capability gap and to refresh transatlantic relations. 
Solving the capabilities gap and refreshing transatlantic relationship desperately 
meant that Europe and the U.S. had to resolve their disagreements over Iraq and other 
security issues. Having examined both the security and economic sides of the 
relationship, Europe and the U.S. had to launch a new initiative to help overcome 
lingering security problems, improve the close relationship by relaxing the U.S. tendency 
to unilateralism and the European tendency toward introversion and fragmentation. 
Above all, the most essential issue was noted by Joschka Fisher: “NATO will remain one 
of the key cornerstones for peace and stability. By the same token, however, we must 
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remember that if we split, the consequences for us all on both sides of the Atlantic will be 
extremely negative.”174  
Meeting the challenges of the 21st century, it became obvious that NATO would 
have to accept a new conceptual foundation and undergo a resolute change, starting with 
the deployment of a rapid-reaction force with global reach. “It’s obvious we’re seeing a 
military metamorphosis of this alliance,” said General James Jones, U.S. Marine Corps, 
Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe.175 NATO thus had to revisit its 
roles in the campaign against terrorism, reconstruct its position in pre-emptive actions as 
well as consequence management, and promote interoperability through a new strategic 
concept.  
In sum, the profound political changes in Europe and the growing gap resulting 
from the U.S. military transformation and the failure of the European armed forces to 
follow that transformation created a new challenge to the transatlantic security system. 
DCI and PCC were launched to improve NATO defense and military capabilities. The 
new NATO’s agenda includes widening its role in Afghanistan, Iraq, and also in the 
Greater Middle East.  
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V. NATO’S GLOBAL BUID-UP 
This chapter discusses NATO’s transformation from a purely transatlantic 
organization to a most effective international security instrument protecting peace 
throughout the world. Josef Joffe notes that NATO I, the anti-Soviet alliance formed in 
1949, dedicated to the Three Musketeers’ principle of “all for one, and one for all,” had 
been replaced by NATO II. This new alliance is no longer the embodiment of a unilateral 
security guarantee by the United States to the Europeans, but a collection of nation-states. 
With its 26 members, “NATO II is going to look like a small United Nations,”176 he said. 
The Alliance’s contribution to international peace confirmed its significance in 
the world affairs. NATO realized that the first front of the effective defense had to be 
abroad before crises erupt. Failing to address the new threats that are not static would 
only increase the danger. After permanent and unproductive out-of-area debates whether 
NATO should go globally, it became clear that NATO did not need to address this issue 
any more because NATO had been global since its establishment. Actually, the Alliance 
commitment to Europe created these profound global implications.  
In addition, the scope of the Alliance domain was characterized by Truman in his 
speech during the signing ceremony. He announced, “The pact will be a positive, not a 
negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not only in the area it 
specifically covers but throughout the world.”177 Already in the early fifties, the 
members’ individual security and the cohesiveness of the Alliance was affected by 
developments outside the formal area of allied responsibility.  
Since NATO cannot effectively coordinate aid programs and development 
activities or tackle any global problems alone, this is again the role for concerted 
cooperation of the “shadow alliance” to promote and protect the common interest. 
Therefore, the United States and Europe unified by NATO’s spirit had to reinforce 
strategic ties with Russia, Japan, China, India and others in order, as articulated in The 
North Atlantic Treaty:  
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to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.178  
Thus, NATO has no other choice but to accept the role of a broader security 
guarantor acting in accordance with the international law. If the international law is not 
proactive to stop atrocities, NATO must develop the mechanism to act in favor of human 
factors. Now, due to the remaining threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, 
the Alliance is forced to adopt a complex interconnection of political, military, economic, 
legal and social aspects and create the basic preconditions enabling it to fulfill its main 
security tasks effectively and globally.179 
 
A. FORCE TRANSFORMATION 
While the essential nature of war has changed remarkably little throughout 
history, the conduct of war changed repeatedly in response to geopolitical, demographic 
and technological developments. Armies that adapted successfully to these trends won, 
those that failed to adapt lost, as well as the nations they defended.  
From history, the military focused merely on state contra state wars. Now, the 
power is moving to the larger non-state system level while violence is moving 
downwards to the individual level. This change leads to the necessity to transform the 
military. Vaclav Havel, a former President of the Czech Republic, said in this context, 
“…responsibility is ours, we must accept it and grasp it here, now, in this place in time 
and space where the Lord has set us down.”180 Subsequently, military transformation 
should be a comprehensive response to threats. The objective is to achieve a full 
spectrum force that is well organized, manned, equipped and trained to be strategically 
responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the 
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entire spectrum of military operations. Transformation is often considered in terms of a 
revolution in military affairs— the new doctrine, organization, and technology that may 
change the nature of warfare. But such a revolution is just one aspect of broader global 
trends.  
Transformation is foremost a continuing process consisting in anticipating the 
future and dealing with the evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, and 
technology. A change in any of these areas above necessitates change in all. As 
innovative ideas emerge, as breakthroughs in science and technology occur, as concepts 
prove their worth through experimentation, transformation must produce a new kind of 
force, a capabilities-based ground force that will dominate across a broad spectrum of 
operations. The overall objective of these changes is simple, sustain competitive in 
warfare. Admiral Cebrowski said, “This is not just about technology. It is about human 
behavior so we are interested in concepts of organizations as well as how they interact 
with each other.”181 The new trend line is around speed of force deployment, speed of 
organization, speed of employment, and speed of sustainment. The changing global 
environment is creating a need for forces to undertake preventive actions, rather than 
reacting to situations. “If you have a reactive force, the temptation is to be punitive. 
Rather, because of the global situation and emerging threats, we want to be much more 
preventive,”182 Cebrowski said. 
Flexibility is a key notion in many respects such as crisis management options, 
defense planning, readiness states, reinforcement planning, and mobility of troops but an 
eye must be kept on other perceptions of what NATO is planning in this regard. Here, 
transparency will be of paramount importance. Mainly, nuclear strategy considerations 
must reflect political, war-preventing nature as nuclear weapons remain the ultimate 
deterrent, weapons of last resort. Apart from the changes in stockpile size and 
composition, it is important to see that the support of the Alliance’s nuclear strategy 
depends more than before on the public’s understanding. When in fact, nuclear weapons 
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cannot be disinvented as their hypothetical elimination would only lead to a destabilizing 
nuclear arms race in a time of tension. In contrast, other potentially irrational nuclear 
powers may have to be deterred because they make any armed conflict incalculable.183 
In fact, the emergence of a foe with weapons of mass destruction, which cannot 
be deterred by the threat of any reprisal, and the need to maintain readiness all add 
impetus to NATO transformation. The slow pace of progress that had been noted since 
the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11 convinced the Alliance that 
urgent steps had to be taken. NATO acknowledged the necessity to reorient itself to 
create deployable forces and enhanced expeditionary capabilities to deal with crises 
wherever they occur.184  
NATO’s Prague Summit 2002 approved the launching of the Alliance’s 
transformation effort, which was based on three pillars: the NATO Response Force 
(NRF), the new flexible and deployable command framework, and the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The agreement was reached in light of the 
acknowledgement that NATO’s structure was overburdened by excessive and inflexible 
Cold War era infrastructure: too many troops and old equipment.185 General Jones—the 
first US Marine General who became SACEUR to reflect the Alliance’s new 
“expeditionary” character—noted “[W]e have too much capability for the past and not 
enough capacity for the future.”186 NATO thus recognized that modern, flexible, rapidly 
deployable joint, meaning sea, land and air forces are required to meet and defeat today’s 
asymmetrical threats.187  
Streamlining the NATO’s Military Command Structure, allies focused on “a 
leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a view to 
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meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.”188 The 
Alliance’s Defense Ministers agreed in June 2003 on the number of NATO’s 
headquarters reducing them from twenty to eleven.189 This process should be completed 
by the summer 2004. The new NATO military structure will be based primarily on tasks 
and capabilities. The traditional division along geographical lines will be definitely 
abolished.190  
At the strategic level, SHAPE stationed at Mons, Belgium, commanded by the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) takes overall responsibility for the 
Alliance’s operations, changing its title from Allied Command Europe (ACE) to Allied 
Command Operations (ACO). SHAPE is henceforth responsible for all Alliance 
operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT. SACO (former 
SACEUR) will continue to be dual-hatted post while also commanding the U.S. 
European Command (USEUCOM). The Allied Command Atlantic at Norfolk, Virginia is 
replaced by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACT will promote the 
transformation of Alliance militaries and improve their ability to inter-operate, whilst 
enhancing the transatlantic link. Its long-term objective will be to foster change, 
evolution and development, providing continual improvement and advancement. Its 
commander, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) will be also dual-
hatted being also in charge of the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The ACT 
structure includes the Joint Warfare Centre in Norway, a new Joint Force Training Centre 
in Poland and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Portugal. ACT 
headquarters is also supervising the Undersea Research Center in La Spezia, Italy, and 
the Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Greece. There will be direct 
linkages between ACT, NATO schools and NATO agencies, and the US Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM). 191 
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At the operational level there are two standing Joint Force Commands (JFC), and 
a Joint Headquarters under ACO. One JFC in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and one in 
Naples, Italy that can conduct operations from their static locations or provide a land-
based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a robust but more limited 
standing Joint Headquarters (JHQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, from which a deployable sea-
based CJTF HQ capability can be drawn. When all these changes are completed, 
operational commands will no longer have an assigned area of responsibilities.192 
At the tactical level there are six component commands with land, maritime, and 
air elements called Joint Force Component Commands (JFCCs). For the JFC in 
Brunssum, the Land Component Command (LCC) is located at Heidelberg, Germany, the 
Maritime Component Command (MCC), at Northwood, the United Kingdom, and the Air 
Component Command (ACC), at Ramstein, Germany. For the JFC in Naples, the LCC is 
located at Madrid, Spain, the MCC in Naples, and the ACC at Izmir, Turkey. 
Additionally, there are four static Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs)—in 
Uedem, Germany, in Finderup, Denmark, in Poggio Renatico, Italy, and in Larissa, 
Greece, two of which are also deployable—in Uedem, and Poggio Renatico. CAOCs will 
operate strictly as coordinating cells for air operations, therefore, they will not be 
regarded as separate headquarters.193 Under the new concept, NATO forces should be 
capable of rapid deployment to crisis areas and remain sustainable, in support of both 
Article 5 and Non-Article 5 operations.  
In all, the new military command structure together with the formation of the 
NATO Response Force (NRF) has become a center-piece and an engine of change for the 
Alliance. In other words, the NATO’s relevance, effectiveness, and future will depend on 
co-operation, consultation and a shared vision for the 21st Century. That is the real 
meaning for transforming and revitalizing the Alliance.  
 
1. Prague Capabilities Commitment 
Besides endorsing the Military Command Structure, the Prague summit reflected 
the prevailing security situation and brought the NATO’s new capabilities initiative, the 




Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). It was designed to improve the Alliance’s 
terrorism-related capabilities and ensure that allies  
be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, 
upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over 
distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced 
with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their 
objectives.194  
Within a strict timeframe, the PCC has focused on progress in the following 
crucial areas: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; intelligence, 
surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and 
communications; combat effectiveness including precision guided munitions and 
suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and 
deployable combat support and combat service support units.195  
PCC has provided for the specialization role on a voluntary basis to bridge the gap 
between the U.S. and European allies—no single country would cover the full range of 
military capabilities. “Those capabilities would be divided amongst allies with each 
concentrating on developing particular aspects of the total requirement.”196 For example, 
the Czech Republic formally offered a chemical and biological warfare unit for future 
operations. This method should have helped smaller members to commit the appropriate 
money on defense. In fact, NATO took responsibility to coordinate NATO labor-division 
to avoid unnecessary duplication.  
However, there are challenges that remain to complete the vision of the Prague 
summit. There has not been a strategic decision by the European allies to either increase 
spending on defense, or to spend differently. For example, whereas the U.S. defense 
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budget in 2003 was $376 billion, 18 European allies spent $140 billion.197 Nicholas 
Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, warned: 
That huge capabilities gap in spending has existed in the Alliance since 
1949. It’s not new. But what’s new is that the premium in military 
capability is now with advanced technology. It costs more. So, the actual 
gap in capabilities is expanding greater than the defense-spending gap. 
That’s a true crisis in the alliance.198 
Another issue to complete has been what Lord Robertson called a “usability gap.” 
Despite 2.4 million NATO Europeans in uniform, only 55,000 of them today are 
deployed outside their countries, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Africa, and other parts of the world. However, the threat will require long-term 
expeditionary missions in the future, then, the Europeans need to increase the percentage 
of their soldiers who are physically fit, equipped, trained and ready to go.199 
Above all, in Prague a new NATO was constructed with plans of a vast 
transformation ahead. The PCC framework initiated a bold endeavor to change radically 
the Alliance’s military posture. That was a dramatic expansion of NATO’s military 
capabilities to react within days, with substantial force in a crisis out-of-area. The 
Alliance also focused on shifting resources toward modernizing equipment. Summing up, 
the PCC framework improved NATO military performance and augmented NATO’s role 
in international affairs even if some difficulties remain unsolved as mentioned above. 
 
2. NATO Response Force 
The NATO Response Force (NRF) was inaugurated on 15 October 2003 with the 
task to reach the initial operational capability (IOC) by October 2004, the final one 
(FOC) not later than October 2006.200 SACEUR General James L. Jones emphasized the 
NRF inauguration act “to be one of the most important changes in the NATO Alliance 
                                                 
197 R. Nicholas Burns, “The New NATO and the Greater Middle East,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 
Remarks at Conference on NATO and the Greater Middle East, Prague, 19 October 2003, available at: 
<http://www.nato.int/usa/ambassador/2003/s031019a.htm>, accessed 12 February 2004. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 NATO’s Defence Ministers Session, Statement on Capabilities, 12 June 2003, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-066e.htm , 15 June 2003.  
65 
since the signing of the Washington Treaty over 50 years ago.”201 The Alliance de facto 
physically and fully entered the global arena: “An agile, flexible, credible NRF with a 
global reach will be instrumental in transforming NATO into a much stronger and more 
effective military alliance with world wide influence.”202 This must be documented as an 
irreversible moment for the NATO’s history.  
Hence, the NRF is an innovative military capability to meet the threats from 
global terrorism. Its purpose is to provide a joint combined force, which is able to deploy 
rapidly wherever needed and undertake the full spectrum of the Alliance’s operations. 
The NRF also gives NATO a strong and credible high readiness capability of preventing 
conflict or threat from escalating into a wider dispute.203 
 In other words, the NRF does not have a standing character but the expeditionary 
design, tailored to the needs of each specific operation. At full capability, the NRF will 
number up to 21,000 personnel with joint air, maritime and land components, deployable 
in five days and sustainable up to one month or more if it is reinforced. “Based on recent 
scenarios, planners consider this to be sufficient time to contain and deter a given threat 
and restore stability, or to signal that more robust, graduated readiness forces are required 
to stabilize a given situation.”204 The NRF will be composed of a brigade-size land 
element including special operations forces, a maritime task force, and an air element 
capable of carrying out 200 combat sorties per day. The force will be capable of 
undertaking the whole variety of the article 5 and non-article 5 operations within or 
beyond its traditional area of responsibility. 205  
Allied Command Operations (ACO) at SHAPE has the operational lead for the 
NRF. This includes standards, certification of the forces, as well as exercises. Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT) will adapt future capabilities, including emerging 
technologies, and develop the doctrine for the force. The NRF is formed within NATO’s 
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Regional Headquarters under the overall command of SACEUR, with operational 
command delegated to the Regional Commanders. “The cycle is based on a period of unit 
and interoperability training, followed by a six-month ‘on-call’ period.”206  
The Allied Forces North Europe (AFNORTH), at Brunssum, the Netherlands, 
took over the first prototype (NRF 1) on 15 October 2003. Allied Forces South Europe 
(AFSOUTH), in Naples, Italy, undertook the second one (NRF 2) on 15 January 2004 
and a new Joint Force Headquarters (JFQ), in Lisbon, Portugal, will take over the third 
one (NRF 3), on 1 July 2004.  
The missions for the NRF are yet to be determined, however, the global reach is 
an important element, especially today, as NATO forces are committed in Kabul, the 
Balkans, and the Mediterranean.207. In specific, its missions will include: collective 
defense obligations; crisis response (including peacekeeping); support counter terrorism 
operations; consequence management (including CBRN events and humanitarian crises); 
peace enforcement; embargo operations (maritime, initial land, and no-fly zone); initial 
entry force; demonstrative force package (quick response operations); and non-combatant 
evacuation.208  
The NRF will also be a key catalyst for improving Alliance military capabilities. 
Moreover, all Allies see the NRF and the European Union’s Headline Goal Force as fully 
compatible and mutually reinforcing initiatives. In practice, the tasks of the NRF are 
likely to focus on those requiring the ability to react in a very short time. These might 
include deployment as a show of force and solidarity to deter aggression,  a stand-alone 
force for Article 5 or non-Article 5 (crisis management, stabilization) operations, and 
deployment as an initial entry force for a larger force.209 
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B. RETHINKING FUTURE ORIENTATION 
The center of gravity for the last 50 years in the Alliance has been in Western 
Europe, but the center of activity is moving east. The geostrategic center of interest for 
the foreseeable future will be the Greater Middle East, a region that stretches from 
northern Africa to the Levant, from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan. There is also an 
emerging concern to NATO’s south because Africa is replete with ungoverned spaces for 
attracting terrorists, radical fundamentalism, WMD, and all kinds of criminality.210  
The Alliance must again together find a new purpose and a new grand strategy to 
meet a different set of challenges beyond its territory. Lord Robertson, a former NATO 
Secretary General said in Berlin in 2003 that the next stage in an effective security 
strategy would be to decide what to do about the threats. He quoted, 
‘Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection-
action, we must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. 
Within this framework, possible pre-emptive action is not out of the 
question, where an explicit and confirmed threat has been recognised.’ 
Donald Rumsfeld or Colin Powell? Actually, the French Ministry of 
Defence in September 2002. Or what about this: ‘We need to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention.’ Not Tommy Franks but the new EU strategy. And my final 
quote comes from Minister Struck’s own excellent Defence Policy 
Guidelines: ‘defence can no longer be narrowed down to geographical 
boundaries, but contributes to safeguarding our security wherever it is in 
jeopardy.’211 
On the other hand, to fight threats with globalized character not only requires to 
operate beyond geographical boundaries, but also to prevent danger from happening 
inside the own territory. In addition, there is the contemplated idea of embracing new 
potential members (Sweden, Austria) to strengthen NATO’s collective security 
management. Furthermore, Ronald Asmus noted,  
In an age when the greatest threats come from terrorists or rogue states 
armed with WMD, the new front line of defense must be transatlantic 
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homeland security. There are few areas in which the need for 
transatlantic cooperation is more self-evident or America’s own interest 
in the EU’s becoming a strong and coherent actor more obvious. In 
fact, it is precisely in this area that U.S.-European cooperation has 
continued largely undisturbed by the Iraq crisis. But much more needs 
to be done. The EU, for instance, needs to create its own Office of 
Homeland Security to expand cooperation in this area.”212 
Another point deserves public consideration. In a globalized world information 
links all parts of the world almost immediately. Lord Robertson stated in this regard: 
[W]e need to redouble efforts to bring the wider public along. One of 
the characteristics of this new security environment is that our security 
policies—and our institutions—are changing faster than the perceptions 
of our publics. As a result, the task of explaining what NATO is and 
what it is doing is becoming ever more demanding. We must therefore 
exercise additional effort to ensure that public understanding of the new 
NATO remains widespread, strong and supportive.213 
The need to devise a NATO global strategy encompasses a more equitable 
burden-sharing relationship with the allies. This is really the most important factor 
threatening the common success. For example, recent budget constraints in Europe were 
a major hurdle to improve European military capabilities significantly. Burden-sharing 
permanently remains “as an attempt by elites to avoid trade-offs between collective and 
national goals.”214 Above all, elite nations saw the whole project as endangering their 
own capability to support their national foreign policy. Moreover, they might not trust 
other countries to provide the assigned capabilities when necessary. Those different 
perceptions and the urgent necessity for action, however, might render the making of 
relevant decisions even more difficult. Wallace Thies describes that elites  
face three constrains: they must not sow pessimism about the alliance by 
doing too little and/or making demands that allies are unable to meet; they 
must not risk the next election by raising doubts about their competence; 
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and they must not alienate voters by openly sacrificing guns to buy 
butter.215  
In other words, burden-sharing is paramount in organizing collective security. In 
democratic societies, it is not immediately feasible, especially in still “unhomogenized” 
Europe. No wonder that the burden of the defense has fallen primarily upon the United 
States. Similarly, one of the constant U.S. complaints has always been that European 
allies do not spend much on defense. The problem of investing to balance the capability 
gap between the U.S. and Europe 
is made by governments that are expected to shelter their citizenry from 
hardships of all sorts, chronically short of the resources needed to do all 
the things expected of them, hence alert to the possibilities for shifting 
some of their burdens to other NATO members, and indeed impelled to try 
hard to do so by the requirements of competing successfully in the next 
election. Since governments in all of the NATO countries are subject to 
these political and economic constraints, reaching agreement among them 
on how to share responsibility for the collective effort is essentially a 
bargaining problem.216  
Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO stated in this regard: 
A NATO in which the U.S. has over 200 strategic lift aircraft, Britain four, 
and the rest of the allies none is unsustainable. A NATO in which the U.S. 
will spend $376 billion on national defense this year and our 18 allies only 
spend $140 billion collectively is unbalanced. A NATO in which the U.S., 
UK and France are alone capable of launching expeditionary military 
missions to distant battlefields is unworkable. As we all face a grave new 
threat to our societies from the toxic mix of terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction, we in NATO must all be prepared militarily to meet that 
threat. No amount of wishful thinking or promises will make the new 
NATO Response Force a reality. Our European allies must now begin to 
meet their commitments to address rapidly the alarming imbalances in 
airlift, precision-guided munitions, air-to-air refueling, sealift and secure 
communications.217 
The commitment of adequate resources is fundamental to improving capabilities. 
However, the defined threshold of 2% of GDP devoted to defense, as one of the criteria 
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for joining the Alliance has not been met by several current member states. Additionally, 
the costly means when deciding what to do with outdated equipment and infrastructure 
that were so closely tied to member states’ national economies has also become a great 
problem. Moreover, some countries while facing strict criteria to join EU were forced to 
cut expenditures on defense. On the other hand, many countries pledged to change their 
traditional attitude and make more lavish contributions after Prague.  
More specifically, the French 2003-2008 Military Program Bill of Law refers to a 
policy of preemption against terrorist networks: “The improvement of long-range strike 
capabilities should constitute a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors, especially as 
transnational terrorist networks develop and organize outside our territory.”218 The bill 
provides for increases in spending on military equipment by nearly $2 billion a year for 
the next six years. The overall French military budget for 2003 rose 6.1 percent over the 
previous year’s budget.219 The British responded to the new environment with the biggest 
sustained real increase in defense spending in 20 years. Britain’s defense budget, already 
the largest in Europe, will increase by 1.2 percent annually until 2006.220 However, 
Germany’s defense budget remains constantly low, partly because of the lowest GDP 
growth in recent years, making Germany Europe’s worst-performing economy since 
1993.221 Thus, Britain and France together represent over 40 percent of all defense 
spending in Europe.  
Another very important aspect is the American RMA. It has major implications 
for NATO, making it more effective in joint military operations. Since the United States 
has access to more intelligence in real time, and has more advanced military technology 
at its disposal, the United States is more or less considered as the peace enforcer, whereas 
Europe specializes in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. Washington made it 
clear that its armed forces were reluctant to do peace making and peace building. 
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However, this convenient division of labor was certainly not politically accepted, since it 
might exacerbate the diverging strategic perspectives among allies.222 
NATO’s immediate future has five clear goals. The first goal is to reinforce 
NATO’s long-term peacekeeping role in Afghanistan, as the stabilization of Afghanistan 
is NATO’s priority task. If the political process fails, that country will again become a 
haven for terrorists. Extending the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 
will help spread stability beyond the capital of Kabul and assist the Karzai Government in 
its task of consolidating the country and strengthening its ownership of the political 
and economic recovery process.223 Therefore, Defense Ministers decided on February 6 
to move out of the Kabul command post to build a nation-wide presence, starting with the 
PRT led by Germany in the northern city of Konduz. NATO is moving to create five 
PRTs in the next six months to bring stability to important provincial cities. NATO will 
take command of all PRTs and ultimately be in a position to take over responsibility for 
all military operations, including the U.S.-led coalition—as soon as security 
circumstances permit. To do that, European nations must contribute more troops and 
resources to buttress a longer and more vigorous NATO presence in the country.224 
The second aim is to examine how NATO might take on a collective military role 
in Iraq, which will be a leading issue at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. While the UN 
and other international aid agencies provide the economic and humanitarian assistance, 
NATO can offer security environment to give Iraqis the time and confidence to manage 
the transition to democracy. Third, NATO must expand its long-term engagement with 
Israel and the Moslem world to help those countries find their way toward a more 
peaceful future in the Greater Middle East. Secretary Powell suggested that NATO 
should transform the Mediterranean Dialogue into a true Partnership offering military 
training and exercises and a closer political relationship. The fourth goal is to improve 
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relations between NATO and the EU as both differed in 2003 over Iraq, in theological 
disputes over Berlin Plus, the Balkans and EU defense plans. The fifth aim is to elevate 
NATO’s relations with Russia. The constructive engagement with Russia, through the 
NATO-Russia Council needs to change from a good forum to a closer relationship.225  
Just as the NATO role in Afghanistan grew from providing logistical and other 
kinds of support to the German and Dutch lead, it is certainly possible to imagine the 
Alliance role in Iraq evolving in a similar fashion in the future. With the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1483 encouraging the international community and regional 
organizations to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq, the door is wide open to more robust 
and active Alliance’s involvement.226 Indeed, stabilizing post-war Iraq by NATO turns to 
be beneficial because the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic have much to lose if Iraq’s 
nation-building effort goes awry.227 
All in all, NATO in the future must be permanently able to develop new skills, 
techniques, and practices as follows: (1) design and employ military forces in 
significantly different ways from those of the past, (2) interact effectively with NGOs, (3) 
deal with the “paradox of information,”228, (4) revise methods of making and carrying 
out U.S. and European foreign policies (5) reconcile the competing demands of domestic 
special interests toward the outside world, (6) build international institutions, practices, 
processes, and relationships that can be sustained over time and that will engage a broad 
range of other countries in collaboration with the Alliance.229 Additionally, the Alliance 
must maintain a sound structure of Nuclear Forces because they will continue to fulfill an 
essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the 
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Allies’ response. Therefore, that uncertainty must maintain the option of the “first 
use.”230 
 
C. NATO’S GLOBAL ROLE 
NATO evolved from a purely continental defensive alliance to an organization 
with a greater collective security role. Moreover, it has transitioned from a security 
alliance focused on the Euro-Atlantic region to an organization possessing the political 
will and military ability to operate on a global scale.  
Lord Robertson, a former NATO Secretary General, stated: “Today, NATO is a 
problem solver. It must go where the trouble is. In today’s world, if we don’t go to the 
trouble, the trouble will come to you.”231 
NATO has come a long way, not just in defining that new consensus, but 
in implementing it. From our anti-terrorist naval patrols in the 
Mediterranean to the stabilisation force in Afghanistan, from our 
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism to measures to protect ourselves 
against chemical and biological attack. From slimming down our 
Command Structure to creating the new NATO Response Force and a 
brand new Supreme Allied Command to drive transformation, this 
Alliance has fully embraced the need to evolve and adapt in line with the 
new strategic environment. 232 
A number of arguments support the idea of widening the geographical horizon of 
the Atlantic alliance. Conflict can no longer be regionalized and technological progress 
tends to abolish geographical distance. In the year 2010, about 80 percent of NATO’s 
territory will be in the range of ballistic missiles launched from the Near and Middle East 
or Northern Africa. The proliferation of missile technology significantly aggravates the 
danger of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and as events in India and Pakistan 
showed, the number of biological, chemical, or even nuclear players in world politics is 
rising. Hence NATO allies are likely to face future military threats from regions far 
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beyond the borders of traditional NATO defense planning. Moreover, vital challenges are 
not strictly limited to the military realm—a sudden cut in the supply of energy from the 
Gulf region or a disruption of trade routes from East Asia would undoubtedly be viewed 
as an essential threat to Europe.233 In the same vein, Nicholas Burns, the U.S. 
ambassador to NATO, noted: 
NATO’s past was focused inward, on Cold War threats directed at the 
heart of Europe. NATO’s future is to look outward to the Greater Middle 
East to expand security in that arc of countries from South and Central 
Asia to the Middle East and North Africa—where the new challenges to 
global peace are rooted.234 
Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. Without this, there 
will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. Furthermore, the 
Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious economic problems, social 
unrest and unresolved conflicts. Extending stability into this part of the world becomes 
crucial as dealing with the Greater Middle East. This area is full of rising anti-Western 
ideologies, terrorism, and proliferation of WMD. The regimes of this region are failing 
and their failures are helping to breed extremist ideologies.235 Indeed, it is from this 
region that the greatest danger to transatlantic societies is likely to originate. 
A vast continent of Sub-Saharan Africa remains dominated by poverty, weak 
governments, unstable societies, and outdated economies. At present, globalization is 
mostly worsening Africa’s plight. Africa needs outside economic help and assistance in 
handling the region’s often-troubled security affairs.236 
Surveying Asia, the age of globalization has many positive effects in triggering 
market reforms, greater democracy, and faster growth. Yet, the 1997 crisis exposed 
Asia’s vulnerability to abrupt financial shocks and its need for further reforms. Moreover, 
globalization is having uneven effects, uplifting elites and coastal areas, but leaving the 
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masses and rural areas in trouble. Asia’s economic progress depends on stable security 
politics, but major change is uncertain as China, Japan and other countries are all 
reevaluating their strategic priorities. The consequence may be greater instability if 
events are not handled properly. The bottom line is that NATO will face a future of 
strategic challenges and opportunities there.237 In this regard, Isabelle Cordonier and 
Bruno Tertrais noted:  
For Westerners, Asia’s stability is perhaps the major strategic stake at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. The magnitude of Asia’s growth and 
the increasing economic and financial interactions among European, 
American, and Asian markets forbid them to treat Asia as “just another 
continent.” In the long-term, the development of strategic ties between 
Asia and the Middle East will have considerable consequences: in a 
henceforth more open geopolitical game, the zone running from the 
Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal could become the meeting point of 
Western and Asian strategies. Scarcely forcing the sketch, two groups of 
countries tied by objective interests stand out: on the one hand, the United 
States-Turkey-Israel-India-Japan; and, on the other hand, China-Pakistan-
Arabian peninsula.238 
Hence, globalization’s uneven dynamics are having very different regional 
consequences. Economics and security affairs are interacting as an engine of progress in 
some regions, but as a source of strain in others. International mechanisms and 
institutions for coping with the challenges of the global era remain asymmetrical. The lag 
in the development of new security structures calls for further strengthening of the 
instruments for regional cooperation and security. Alliances like NATO will remain a 
pervasive feature of international politics, even as they must adapt to changing 
circumstances. Illustrative is the success in Europe, where the Partnership for Peace and 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council allowed NATO countries to build a web of 
political and military cooperation.239   
Nicholas R. Burns said: 
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NATO remains today the world’s most powerful and important alliance. It 
took 55 years for Europeans and North Americans to build this Alliance, 
which serves as our bridge across the Atlantic, our principal forum to 
work together and our mutual protection in a dangerous world. It is well 
worth preserving and advancing for all the challenges ahead of us…. to 
keeping NATO at the center of the great effort to build a democratic, 
peaceful and secure world in the years ahead.240  
Granted, NATO has its own rationale and motive to exist in the 21st century. 
Similarly, Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler say that “A big organization without 
purpose eventually loses its legitimacy and will to live. After that a slow death is 
inevitable.”241 In fact, NATO’s future depends on a clear political definition of its future 
tasks. These include the classic security function as an insurance against events going 
wrong, the function of consultation on political and military issues throughout the world, 
the development of arms control policies and the monitoring and verification of 
agreements, and the intra Alliance functions to serve as glue that sticks countries 
together. NATO’s future further depends on a new balance of American and European 
defense responsibilities, a convincing explanation of the NATO’s function as a safety net 
in a period of potential instability, a credible rationale as to why it continues to make 
sense to provide for security in a collective manner.242  
Last but not least, the convergence between NATO and the United Nations in 
terms of security seems to be inevitable. NATO is no longer a regional security 
organization but collective security instrument acting in a global scope, so as the United 
Nations. Both organizations were “established to provide predictability and order in a 
world in constant flux and both organizations are the symbol of humanity’s collective 
aspirations for a better life in a safer world for all.”243 Whereas NATO adopted a 
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complex rational transformation program, the United Nations remains complacent about 
the security consequences caused by globalization.  
A NATO that can project power and purpose outside Europe will greatly enhance 
the odds of preserving world peace while advancing democratic values. The simple 
reality is that the United States cannot handle the global problems of the contemporary 
era alone, and neither can Europe nor the United Nations. Together, however, they can 
succeed. This is a main reason for keeping NATO alive and healthy, and for transforming 
it in the effective instrument with global reach. The challenge facing the Atlantic Alliance 
is to pursue these goals in an effective manner that the United States, Europe, and United 
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In just two years, NATO changed more than at any time in its history. In a major 
new initiative launched at the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Allies agreed to acquire, over 
time, a range of new military capabilities necessary for the expeditionary missions far 
from Europe that are redefining the way allies plan and think about their national and 
collective defense. In summer 2003, NATO adopted a leaner and more flexible command 
structure, negotiated in record time. In December, NATO created a new Chemical, 
Biological and Nuclear Defense Battalion to protect NATO’s populations in the event of 
an attack using weapons of mass destruction. And in the most important and decisive 
shift to a 21st century, NATO is building a NATO Response Force that will give NATO 
a powerful and quick capability to deploy its troops within days. 245 This new virtue gives 
NATO the ability to act as the best international military framework in the world more 
quickly and decisively inside and outside of the transatlantic sphere than ever before in its 
history.  
Those revolutionary changes on the military side of NATO are complemented by 
equally creative political changes. Seven Central European countries will join NATO in 
April 2004. This is the largest single enlargement since NATO’s founding in 1949. The 
old Cold War truth was to worry that adding new countries would weaken the Alliance. 
The new truth is that enlargement strengthens NATO and extends its sphere of security 
eastward. Once the seven new members join the Alliance, forty percent of NATO will be 
formerly socialist countries. These new members will refresh the spirit of the Alliance 
and add real value militarily and politically to the NATO’s collective strength.246  
The emerging democratic peace in Europe is a major, historic achievement but a 
united Europe will only be sustained if NATO builds partnerships with those countries 
outside of NATO—especially Russia. The same is true of NATO’s special relationship 
with Ukraine as it is a country of strategic importance. Additionally, a new strategic 
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engagement to the Central Asia and the Caucasus is so critical to NATO’s efforts in 
Afghanistan. These initiatives will certainly be a focus for Partnership for Peace in the 
years ahead. Thus, the substantial changes in NATO’s military mission, membership and 
partnerships have positioned NATO for another ambitious future.247 
However, the age of globalization requires both the emergence of effective 
international structures (like NATO) and the paralysis of the nation-state functions. As a 
matter of fact, sustainable globalization requires a stable power structure. The global 
environmental and security change and its subsequent social and economic effects are 
likely to continue and intensify in the future. The intensity will affect the development of 
international system with its elements—nation-states. Therefore, these challenges call for 
mutual cooperation at the international level, which provides for complex interconnection 
of environmental, political, military, economic, legal and social aspects. The central 
objective of foreign and security policy should be to shape the emerging world order in 
ways that protect interests and common values. 
The answer to the question of the new world order must be given top priority in 
the transatlantic relationship. In political terms, a comprehensive issue of security must 
lead to a reorganization of the international system of states. It must lead to a new world 
order in which six billion people, more than 190 states and all the many religions and 
cultures can live altogether relatively peacefully. It also entails the creation of a fair 
world trade system, answers to climate change and preservation of the global 
environment, the fight against poverty and AIDS, support of human rights and continued 
development of international law and its institutions. For that, Joschka Fischer says “we 
need more than strong democracies based on a stable foundation of values. We also need 
strong multilateral institutions—first and foremost a reformed UN.”248  
The United Nations remains the indispensable center for harmonizing the separate 
national interests into a common set of global policies and international actions. UN is 
not only the international symbol, but mainly the institutional means of bringing about 
                                                 
247 Ibid.  
248 Joschka Fischer, “Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relations,” 
Speech by German Foreign Minister at Princeton University, 19 November 2003, Council on Foreign 
Relations, available at: <http://www.cfr.org/reg_index.php?id=5|||1>, accessed 11 January 2004. 
81 
such a better future for all of humanity. Its structures and processes should be a principal 
for attaining humanity’s collective goals.249 Therefore, an appropriate strategy for the 
period immediately ahead would be reliance on the United Nations system, under 
appropriate circumstances, for peacekeeping and crisis management actions requiring the 
material support of Western governments.250  
The United Nations currently deploys more than 45,000 peacekeepers, but their 
effectiveness is severely limited because they are supposed to enforce existing peace 
accords and stay strictly neutral even if one party is clearly at fault. This does nothing to 
help in places like Rwanda and Haiti, where there is no peace to enforce. The idea of 
creating a more robust U.N. force capable of smiting aggressors has been around since 
the late 1940s. It got a brief burst of life in the early 1990s after the Cold War, but it was 
entombed after the U.N. was blamed for failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.251 
It’s time to resurrect the idea of a standing UN army, as a supplement, if not 
replacement, for the other forces mentioned above. The key to making it work would be 
eschewing the old UN way of conducting business, which consists of asking for military 
contributions from a lot of countries with minimal capabilities, no record of working 
together and differing strategic interests. The UN needs a tough, professional force like 
the NATO Response Force or the French Foreign Legion that would not quail before 
Haitian gang leaders or Serbian ethnic-cleansers.252 It seems that NATO after acquiring 
an agile, flexible, and credible NRF with a global reach will be a proper instrument to fit 
into this requirement.  
Above all, a new world order must be based on effective multilateralism, which is 
able to impose peace and security. This effective multilateralism requires both the U.S., 
as a world power, and the UN, as a framework institution because the UN is the only 
international organization with the resource of global legitimacy. Therefore, the UN must 
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exert its authority on the international scene. Otherwise, the U.S. and EU, respectively 
NATO, may be less inclined to use UN to resolve the world crises in the future. A radical 
reform of the United Nations, calling for stronger action against weapons of mass 
destruction, swifter intervention in humanitarian crises and an overhaul of bureaucracy is 
desperately needed. A wide reform is necessary if the United Nations is to remain the 
main forum for collective international action. The UN is at risk of failing in its role 
unless it evolves to tackle the threat posed by international terrorism and failing states.253 
Finally, the globalized world of the 21st century will not be a homogenous place. 
The global era demands new approaches to managing change and containing crises. 
While stability in the Cold War required the maintenance of deterrence and preservation 
of the political status quo, stability in the global era means peaceful adaptation to change. 
Globalization has changed the way people see and understand security matters and the 
military. Charles Moskos says, “No social institution is more affected by both national 
and international factors than the military.”254 Therefore, the military must adapt to a new 
environment and stay one step ahead: successful strategies and policies in the global era 
require much closer coordination as challenges in civil-military relations in the 
contemporary world are central to all democratic states. The promotion of global norms 
and institutions for managing change and conflict will be an important element of an 
effective strategy. NATO’s burden to deal with security is an inevitable element to make 
globalization less unpredictable. Then, NATO will surely survive even if UN and other 
international organization become the more important platform for settling disputes.  
Vaclav Havel, a former President of the Czech Republic, insisted that the West 
should retain a normative identity, “a metaphysically anchored sense of responsibility.” 
But the metaphysics of the Alliance could be the doctrine of international community. 
NATO’s task should be to rededicate itself permanently and gradually to a different 
project, to admit that there were values which transcended the West, to find what it had in 
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common with other cultures and “join forces with them in search for a common moral 
minimum.”255 
In the end, America and Europe through NATO can master the challenges of the 
21st century, but only if they act together. In doing so, three fundamental elements must 
be taken into consideration. The first element is the unconditional commitment of the 
Western democracies to their own fundamental values—freedom, human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and the free market economy. The second element is the 
commitment to and respect for an international order based on shared values, the law, 
consent, cooperation and participation. The third element is the political determination 
and military strength to avert new dangers. Both components are necessary to destroy all 
totalitarian networks and ideologies built on hatred. The road to success for the Western 
democracies should lie in combining these three elements, which determine effective 
multilateralism. These principles should guide both sides of the Atlantic in making the 
joint contribution towards a peaceful, just and democratic world order.256 It is a shared 
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